Presumed Guilty until Proven Innocent: The Burden of Proof in Wrongful Conviction Claims under State Compensation Statutes by Kahn, Daniel S.
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 
Volume 44
2010 
Presumed Guilty until Proven Innocent: The Burden of Proof in 
Wrongful Conviction Claims under State Compensation Statutes 
Daniel S. Kahn 
Department of Justice, Criminal Division Fraud Section 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr 
 Part of the Courts Commons, Legal Remedies Commons, Legislation Commons, and the State and 
Local Government Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Daniel S. Kahn, Presumed Guilty until Proven Innocent: The Burden of Proof in Wrongful Conviction Claims 
under State Compensation Statutes, 44 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 123 (2010). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol44/iss1/4 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
PRESUMED GUILTY UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT:
THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN WRONGFUL CONVICTION
CLAIMS UNDER STATE COMPENSATION STATUTES
Daniel S. Kahn*
Despite significant efforts to uncover and prevent wrongful convictions, little at-
tention has been paid to the compensation of wrongfully convicted individuals
once they are released from prison. State compensation statutes offer the best path
to redress because they do not require the claimant to prove that the state was at
fault for the wrongful conviction and because they are not susceptible to the same
political influences as other methods of compensation. However, even under com-
pensation statutes, too many meritorious claims are dismissed, settled for far too
little, or never brought in the first place. After examining the current statutory
framework, this Article analyzes the arguments for and against one potential solu-
tion to this problem that so far has not been considered-shifting the burden of
proof to the state on the issue of innocence. Currently, the jurisdictions that have
enacted statutes require that the claimant prove his or her innocence in order to re-
cover compensation. Shifting the burden to the state to prove that the claimant is
guilty would be more efficient because the state has better access to the relevant evi-
dence, it could rely exclusively on the criminal trial transcript, and it is in a better
position to bear the costs of litigation and to determine when to settle. Although
this solution implicates several concerns, these concerns can be addressed through
checks already built into the criminal justice system and by adjustments that can
be made to the compensation statutes.
INTRODUCTION
There is no longer a question of whether our justice system pro-
duces convictions of innocent persons. Over the past thirty years,
DNA evidence has revealed a much deeper problem than had ever
been thought to exist, uncovering hundreds of cases in which indi-
viduals have spent years in prison, and in some instances executed,
for crimes they did not commit. The problem, however, has not
gone unattended. Individuals and organizations across segments of
the legal world-including advocacy groups, defense attorneys,
* Department of Justice, Criminal Division Fraud Section. Prior to joining the De-
partment ofJustice, Daniel Kahn worked as a litigator at Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP. While
at Davis Polk, he helped to obtain an acquittal at a retrial for a wrongfully convicted individ-
ual and to secure a $1.8 million judgment against the State of New York under New York's
wrongful conviction statute. He graduated cum laude from Harvard Law School and summa
cum laude from Cornell University. The views expressed in this Article are the author's
alone and do not reflect those of the Department ofJustice.
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academics, judges, police, and prosecutors'-have enlisted to con-
front the issue and are making headway.
Most of the efforts in this area, and indeed most of the scholarly
articles, have concentrated on the causes and possible prevention
of wrongful convictions,3 while relatively little attention has been
paid to compensating wrongfully convicted persons once they are
finally freed. Yet it is now quite clear, if it was not before, that
wrongfully convicted persons require compensation, not just for
lost wages and the pain and suffering endured while incarcerated,
but also for the substantial obstacles they face when they attempt to
reenter and regain their life after prison. Until recently, in order to
recover compensation, wrongfully convicted persons have had
three remedial options at their disposal: a § 1983 civil rights claim,
a common law tort claim, and a private legislative bill. Each of the-
se avenues presents its own roadblocks. Civil rights and common
law tort claims require a showing of culpability on the part of the
government, which often is either not present or extremely diffi-
cult for claimants to establish. Private bills are rarely passed, and
reflect more the political connections of the wrongfully convicted
person and the publicity surrounding the exoneration rather than
the merits of the claim for compensation.
Over the past several decades, however, a number of jurisdic-
tions have enacted statutes that hold states strictly liable for
wrongful convictions and provide compensation to any wrongfully
convicted person who can meet certain eligibility requirements.
1. For example, the New York Justice Task Force, whose mission it is to investigate
and prevent wrongful convictions, was created by New York's Chief Judge, Jonathan Lipp-
man, is co-chaired by Court of Appeals Judge Theodore Jones and Westchester District
Attorney Janet DiFiore, and is constituted by a number of judges, prosecutors, defense at-
torneys, victims rights advocates, members of the New York legislature, New York Police
Department Commissioner Ray Kelly, and New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo,
among others. Nicholas Confessore, Top Judge Plans a Task Force on Wrongful Convictions, N.Y.
TIMES, May 1, 2009, at A19.
2. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-284.51 (West 2009) ("The purpose of this Ar-
ticle is to help solve crime, convict the guilty, and exonerate the innocent in criminal
proceedings by improving procedures for eyewitness identification of suspects."); W. VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 62-1E-1 to -3 (LexisNexis 2009); N.J. ATTORNEY GENERAL, ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING AND CONDUCTING PHOTO AND LIVE LINEUP
IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES (2001).
3. See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (2008) (ex-
amining how the criminal justice system handled the cases of individuals who were convicted
and later exonerated by DNA evidence); Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United
States 1989 Through 2003, 95J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523 (2005).
4. See, e.g., Shawn Armbrust, Note, When Money Isn't Enough: The Case for Holistic Com-
pensation of the Wrongfully Convicted, 41 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 157, 159 (2004) ("Scholars and
commentators have focused quite often on the problem of convicting the innocent and the
causes of wrongful convictions, while very few scholars have focused on the aftereffects of
wrongful conviction." (footnote omitted)).
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Although these statutes appear to present the best opportunity for
recovery for wrongfully convicted persons, they present their own
problems. Due to the heavy burden placed on the claimant and the
protracted nature of the litigation that often is involved in recover-
ing an award, a large number of meritorious claims are dismissed,
settled for an insignificant amount, or never even brought. While
some have advocated reforming the compensation statutes by loos-
ening eligibility requirements and lifting caps on damages, neither
of these suggestions addresses the difficulty and duration of obtain-
ing much-needed compensation.
One aspect of the compensation statutes that could offer a solu-
tion to this problem-and an aspect that has received little scrutiny
by the legal and academic community5-is the burden of proof.
This Article examines the arguments for and against shifting the
burden of proof to the state on the issue of guilt as a possible solu-
tion to the problems raised by the current framework. Part II of
this Article provides a brief background of wrongful convictions
and the various methods by which a wrongfully convicted person
can pursue compensation. Part III details the current statutory
frameworks in the jurisdictions that have passed compensation
statutes, including the eligibility requirements, disqualifications,
and caps on damages. Part IV analyzes the justifications and risks
implicated by shifting the burden of proof to the state and the pos-
sible solutions to those risks if a state is so inclined to adopt such a
framework.
Currently, most of the jurisdictions that have enacted statutes-
which include twenty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and
the federal government-flip the criminal presumption of inno-
cence by presuming that claimants are guilty until they can prove
their innocence by a preponderance of the evidence or by clear
and convincing evidence. This approach places a heavy burden on
persons who often do not possess the resources to carry that bur-
den; it demands that the wrongfully convicted person come
forward with evidence related to the crime when it is often the
state that possesses such evidence, and it delays for years the time it
takes for a wrongfully convicted person to recover much-needed
compensation.
5. See John Martinez, Wrongful Convictions as Rightful Takings: Protecting "Liberty-
Property," 59 HASTINGs L.J. 515, 524 (2008) ("Definition of the appropriate standard of
proof, including the myriad complexities of presumptions, and allocation and shifting of the
burdens of production and persuasion requires further study, but is beyond the scope of this
Article.").
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Yet while shifting the burden to the state addresses these con-
cerns, it too implicates its own problems. Placing the burden on
the state increases the risk of compensating a guilty individual who
was released from prison, not on the grounds of innocence, but on
a procedural or legal failure. Moreover, shifting the burden of
proof to the state would shift the costs of litigation along with it,
and likely would lead to additional recoveries and settlements paid
by states that are already over-budgeted and over-extended. Yet
these problems can be addressed through safeguards in the cur-
rent judicial system and careful drafting of compensation statutes.
So long as eligibility requirements are drafted stringently and as
long as there is a reasonable cap on damages, shifting the burden
to the state could more quickly compensate a broader range of in-
nocent individuals who were wrongfully convicted and, at the same
time, avoid compensating guilty individuals and increasing costs
for states to an unsustainable level.
I. WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND COMPENSATION
A. Uncovering and Preventing Wrongful Convictions
The rising awareness of wrongful convictions can be traced di-
rectly to the advancement of DNA testing and technology. Indeed,
" [u]ntil [the first DNA exoneration in 1989], exonerations of false-
ly convicted defendants were seen as aberrational. Since 1989,
these once-rare events have become disturbingly commonplace."6
One recent study documented 340 exonerations of wrongfully
convicted individuals between 1989 and 2003 alone. However,
DNA evidence cannot serve as a panacea for detecting wrongful
convictions. Evidence that is susceptible to DNA testing is not
available in most cases. Moreover, even when this evidence is avail-
6. Gross et al., supra note 3, at 523; see also Stanley Z. Fisher, Convictions ofInnocent Per-
sons in Massachusetts: An Overview, 12 B.U. Pus. Ir. L.J. 1, 1-3 (2002) ("A rising tide of
prisoner exonerations, a significant number of which have relied upon DNA testing, has
revealed how miscarriages ofjustice can result from deficient practices of police interroga-
tion and eyewitness identification, inadequate disclosure of exculpatory evidence,
acceptance of unreliable 'junk science' and 'snitch' testimony, and ineffective assistance of
counsel." (footnote omitted)).
7. Gross et al., supra note 3, at 529; cf Alberto B. Lopez, $10 and a Denim jacket? A
Model Statute for Compensating the Wrongly Convicted, 36 GA. L. REv. 665, 670 (2002) ("More
recently, a 1992 study documented 416 unjust convictions in capital and potential capital
cases from 1900 to 1991, including twenty-three cases of wrongful execution.").
8. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 3, at 116 ("DNA evidence is not available or probative
in the vast majority of criminal cases. DNA testing can only be used to show identity when
biological evidence from the perpetrator has been left at the scene of the crime; the vast
126 [VOL. 44:1
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able, there are a number of obstacles facing wrongfully imprisoned
persons who wish to challenge their conviction, including a lack of
resources required by the state to preserve such evidence and limi-
tations that a number of states place on DNA testing after an
individual has been convicted.9 So while DNA exonerations have
demonstrated the ability of our government to correct its mistakes,
they also have served as a "miner's canary" by shining a spotlight
on the most serious and troubling flaw in the justice system-the
unknown number of innocent individuals who remain imprisoned
for crimes they did not commit.
Unable to rely exclusively on DNA testing to purge the system of
wrongful convictions, individuals and groups from across the legal
community have taken up the cause. Just as proof of wrongful con-
victions has increased exponentially over the past two decades, so
too have the efforts to uncover and prevent them. In this last decade
alone, at least nine states have created commissions to examine and
remedy wrongful convictions, including California, Connecticut,
Illinois, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia,
and Wisconsin.'o A number of legal organizations-including the
American Bar Association and the New York Bar Association-also
majority of criminal cases lack such biological evidence."); Daniel S. Medwed, Anatomy of a
Wrongful Conviction: Theoretical Implications and Practical Solutions, 51 VILL. L. REv. 337, 356
(2006) ("[T]he bulk of wrongful convictions ... lack any biological evidence that could be
subject to DNA testing.").
9. See Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error, and Federal Wrongful Conviction
Law, 2005 Wis. L. REv. 35, 51 ("DNA testing can be used only in a limited number of cases:
when biological evidence may have been left by the perpetrator at the scene of the crime,
that evidence was collected by law enforcement, that evidence was preserved, and the state
permits access to such testing."); see also ALA. CODE § 15-18-200 (LexisNexis 1995) (limiting
post-conviction DNA testing to individuals convicted of committing a capital offense); MD.
CODE ANN., CIm. PROC. § 8-201 (LexisNexis 2008) (limiting post-conviction DNA testing to
individuals convicted of murder, manslaughter, rape, or sexual assault); Commonwealth v.
Wright, 935 A.2d 542, 547 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (denying request for DNA testing because
appellant confessed to the crime and the confession was "finally litigated, found not to be
coerced, and was knowingly and voluntarily given").
10. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1460-75 (2009) (creating the North Carolina Innocence
Inquiry Commission); VA. CODE ANN. § 30-156 (2009) (creating the Virginia State Crime
Commission); H.B. No. 5753, 2002 Gen. Assemb., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 2002) (creating the
Connecticut Innocence Commission); H.B. No. 498, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009); Ill.
Exec. Order No. 4 (2000) (creating the Illinois Governor's Commission on Capital Punish-
ment); CAL. COMM'N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT (2008) [hereinafter
CAL. COMM'N, FINAL REPORT]; Wis. LEGIS. REFERENCE BUREAU, LEGISLATIVE BRIEF 06-18,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORMS: 2005 WIscoNSIN ACT 60 (2006); Gabrielle Banks, Pennsylvania
Panel To Study Wrongfiul Convictions, PirrSBURGH PosT-GAZETTE, March 31, 2007, available at
http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/07090/ 7 7 4016-85.stm (discussing the Pennsylvania Inno-
cence Commission); Confessore, supra note 1 (discussing the New York Justice Task Force);
N.C. Actual Innocence Comm'n, North Carolina Actual Innocence Commission-Mission State-
ment, Objectives, and Procedures, INNOCENCE PROJECT (2003), http://www.innocenceproject
org/docs/NCInnocenceCommissionMission.html.
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have directed their attention and resources to wrongful convic-
tions, undertaking studies and analyses of the issue." Moreover, the
establishment of units within district attorneys offices "to examine
[wrongful] convictions is an emerging trend.""
These efforts have uncovered what are now thought to be the
main causes of wrongful convictions: namely, eyewitness misidenti-
fications, unreliability of testimony by jailhouse informants, false
confessions, inadequate representation by defense attorneys, and
improper practices by prosecuting attorneys. 3 In response to these
findings, the Department of Justice, state innocence commissions,
legal organizations, and academics already have made recommen-
dations aimed at decreasing the incidence of wrongful
convictions, 4 and several states already have acted on those rec-
ommendations.'5 For example, New Jersey became "the first state
in the Nation to officially adopt the recommendations issued by
the United States Department of Justice in its Eyewitness Evidence
Guidelines" when the New Jersey Attorney General in 2001 imple-
mented the Attorney General Guidelines for Preparing and Conducting
Photo and Live Lineup Identification Procedures.6 According to the At-
torney General, the guidelines "incorporate more than 20 years of
scientific research on memory and interview techniques" and "will
improve the eyewitness identification process in New Jersey to en-
sure that the criminal justice system will fairly and effectively elicit
accurate and reliable eyewitness evidence."
These continued and significant efforts hopefully will curb the
rate of wrongful convictions. However, as the list of exonerations
11. AM. BAR Ass'N, ACHIEVING JUSTICE: FREEING THE INNOCENT, CONVICTING THE
GUILTY (2006); N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, FINAL
REPORT (2009).
12. John Eligon, Prosecutor in Manhattan Will Monitor Convictions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5,
2010, at A20 (discussing Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus Vance,Jr.'s creation of a Convic-
tion Integrity Program to examine and prevent wrongful convictions).
13. See, e.g., CAL. COMM'N, FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 10-21; N.Y. STATE BAR
Ass'N TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, supra note 11, at 6; Understand the Causes,
INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/ (last visited Oct. 10,
2010).
14. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE & NAT'L INST. OFJUSTICE, CRIME SCENE INVESTIGA-
TION: A GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT (2000); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & NAT'L INST. OF
JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT (1999); CAL. COMM'N,
FINAL REPORT, supra note 10; Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recom-
mendationsfor Lineups and Photospreads, 22 LAw & Hum. BEHAV. 603,630 (1998).
15. See supra note 2.
16. Letter from John J. Farmer, Jr., N.J. Attorney General, to All County Prosecutors,
Col. Carson J. Dunbar,Jr., Superintendent, NewJersey State Police, All Police Chiefs and All
Law Enforcement Chief Executives 1 (Apr. 18, 2001) (on file with the University of Michi-
gan Journal of Law Reform).
17. Id.
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continues to grow, and since the eradication of wrongful convic-
tions altogether seems quixotic, the justice system also must
address the treatment of wrongfully convicted persons once they
are released from prison.
B. Compensating the Wrongfully Convicted
After finally obtaining their freedom, wrongfully convicted per-
sons face a number of significant obstacles to regaining their life."'
Many spend tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of dollars funding
their appeal, leaving them in substantial debt.19 Hiring the best at-
torney they can find will give them the best chance of a reversal,
but it also is likely to cost them the most money, making the climb
out of debt that much more difficult. To make matters worse, after
being deprived of the job experience and wages they would have
earned had they not been in prison, these individuals face unique
impediments to securing new employ.
For example, many job applications contain a question about
the criminal history of the applicant. The wrongly convicted
person must at least admit to being arrested and may have to
reveal that he was convicted ... . Even if an explanation is ar-
ticulated and accepted by a potential employer, the wrongly
convicted person faces a competitive workplace with no em-
ployment history, no recent references, and a lack of technical
skills frequently required to perform many jobs in our com-
puterized society.20
This makes it exceedingly difficult for recently freed individuals to
get back on their feet.
Yet the consequences of wrongful conviction are not only finan-
cial in nature. While in prison, the wrongfully convicted suffer
considerable emotional, psychological, and physical harm. For ex-
ample, in Baba-Ali v. State, a father was wrongfully convicted of
molesting his daughter.21 The court noted that "[iun prison, con-
victed child molesters were raped or murdered or both . ... [Mr.
18. Lopez, supra note 7, at 720 ("Not only will a wrongly convicted person forever face
questions about his true innocence of the crime, but he will also encounter everyday hard-
ships while trying to resume his life outside of prison.").
19. See, e.g., Armbrust, supra note 4, at 158-59 (noting that "[one] family invested
about $200,000 to help fund his appeals").
20. Lopez, supra note 7, at 720.
21. 878 N.Y.S.2d 555 (Ct. Cl. 2009).
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Baba-Ali] was 'afraid for his life' from the day he arrived in prison
until the day he left."22 Similarly, in Jones v. State, Mr. Jones was
wrongly convicted of murdering a kingpin in the Bloods street
gang.23 The court stated:
While incarcerated, he received threats on a daily basis as the
purported killer of a Bloods gang member. At some point, he
learned that a contract had been taken out against him. When
housed in Elmira Correctional Facility, he was attacked by an-
other inmate with a razor blade, which resulted in his
segregation from the general population.
Nor is the emotional nightmare endured in prison vanquished by a
legal finding of innocence. Many continue to suffer the conse-
quences of their wrongful incarceration long after they are freed.
After being exonerated, Mr. Baba-Ali was diagnosed with chronic
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and "clinically significant depres-
,,25sion.
As if the physical and psychological impact were not enough, the
social stigma associated with being imprisoned-even if wrongful-
ly-makes it difficult for wrongfully convicted persons to regain
their reputation. This can wreak havoc on their daily lives after
prison, from tasks as basic as retrieving their driver's license from
the state after being released, to dealing with child support pay-
ments that accumulated while incarcerated, to being unwelcomed
into the new neighborhood into which they move.
In all, the social, economic, and emotional suffering that stems
from a wrongful conviction requires some form of remediation.
22. Id. at 561.
23. No. 2009-014-051 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. Aug. 19, 2009).
24. Id. at 5.
25. Baba-Ali, 878 N.Y.S.2d at 563.
26. See Lopez, supra note 7, at 720-21 ("[T]he most damaging injury inflicted upon
the wrongly convicted is not necessarily the time lost behind bars, but the stigma that follows
them for the rest of their lives."); see also Baba-Ali, 878 N.Y.S.2d at 561 ("The court also rec-
ognizes the toll the heinous nature of these crimes of moral turpitude has taken on
claimant's reputation.").
27. See, e.g., Baba-Ali, 878 N.Y.S.2d at 562 ("[T]he stigma and lingering doubt the con-
viction had engendered adversely affected how the New York City Department of Social
Services and the court-appointed law guardian both reacted to claimant's efforts to remove
the Family Court's order of protection.").
28. See Martinez, supra note 5, at 537 ("[Flreedom alone is not enough for the person
who has been chewed up by the criminal justice system and then spit out as wrongfully con-
victed, lacking compensation for the harm suffered."); Teressa E. Ravenell, Cause and
Conviction: The Role of Causation in § 1983 Wrongful Conviction Claims, 81 TEMP. L. REv. 689,
691 (2008) ("Although wrongful convictions may be an inevitable consequence of our crim-
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Exactly what form that compensation should take and the meth-
od by which it should be provided have yet to gain consensus.
Currently, there are serious failings in the way that wrongfully
convicted individuals are compensated. The California Commis-
sion on the Fair Administration of Justice, for example, noted in
its final report:
[E]ven the limited resources made available to convicted
felons who have served their sentences and are released
from prison are not available to those whose convictions
have been set aside. Parolees are released to the community
in which they were arrested or convicted; services such as
counseling and assistance in locating housing or jobs are
limited to those who remain under parole supervision. But
those who are being released because their conviction is set
aside, including those who have been found innocent, re-
29ceive none of these services.
In many states, the recompense provided to the wrongfully con-
victed person upon his or her release is simply inadequate,o
forcing the individual to pursue legal or legislative alternatives.
C. Possible Legal Remedies for Wrongfully Convicted Persons
There are several legal channels through which a wrongfully
convicted individual can attain compensation. They include con-
stitutional and common law tort remedies, private legislative bills,
and, in roughly half of the states, actions under state compensa-
tion statutes.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL AND COMMON LAw TORT REMEDIES
One option at the disposal of a wrongfully convicted person is
to sue the government under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the "depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
inal justice system, it would seem that a person wrongly deprived of his liberty is entitled to a
civil remedy to compensate for the mistakes of the criminal system.").
29. CAL. COMM'N, FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 105.
30. See, e.g., Lopez, supra note 7, at 669 ("For Graham's time and trouble in prison, the
State of Louisiana gave him what every inmate receives upon being released from prison,
whether guilty of the crime charged or not-ten dollars and a denim jacket.").
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Constitution and laws."31 Yet many wrongfully convicted persons
cannot satisfy the requirements for succeeding on such a claim.
For example, "[§] 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights,
but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights else-
where conferred. The first step in any such claim is to identify the
specific constitutional right allegedly infringed."3 2 However, not all
wrongfully convicted individuals have been deprived of a right
covered by § 1983. Perhaps even more fatal to most claims, § 1983
requires culpable conduct on the part of the government; constitu-
tional violations "are just not triggered by lack of due care.",3 Many
wrongful convictions do not arise from any misconduct on the part
of the government,34 but are instead a product of unintentional
misidentifications by eyewitnesses or false testimony by jailhouse
informants. 3 Even where a government official has acted
negligently or intentionally, it is difficult to prove, and "the need
to protect ... the vigorous exercise of official authority", 3
31. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). While this remedy is available to an individual whose con-
viction has been reversed or overturned, the Supreme Court has held that it is not available
to those still in prison. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).
32. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted).
33. Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986); see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.
327, 330 (1986) ("[M]erely negligent conduct may not be enough to state a claim."); Porter
v. White, 483 F.3d 1294, 1308 (11th Cir. 2007) ("[A] negligent act or omission cannot pro-
vide a basis for liability in a § 1983 action seeking compensation for loss of liberty
occasioned by a Brady violation."); Garrett, supra note 9, at 54 ("A wrongful conviction, like
any injury, is actionable under civil rights law only if it was the result of official misconduct,
and not only coincidence, mistake, or negligence.").
34. See, e.g., Adele Bernhard, When justice Fails: Indemnification for Unjust Conviction, 6 U.
CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 73, 86 (1999) ("In many-if not most-of the cases where an
innocent person was convicted no single person can be described as having been negligent
or at fault."); Ravenell, supra note 28, at 692 ("[A]lthough [wrongful] convictions may be
factually wrong, they may not be legally wrong.").
35. See, e.g., Cynthia E. Jones, The Right Remedy for the Wrongly Convicted: judicial Sanc-
tions for Destruction of DNA Evidence, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 2893, 2928 (2009) (citing
eyewitness identifications and testimony ofjailhouse informants as two of the leading causes
of wrongful conviction).
36. Martinez, supra note 5, at 532 ("[C]laims against governmental defendants indi-
vidually in their personal capacities usually fail to meet the high standards of proof required
under state and federal law, which demand that claimants prove the defendants acted inten-
tionally or recklessly; that defendants acted outside the scope of their employment; or that
defendants acted while under the influence of drugs or alcohol.").
37. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978), quoted in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800,807 (1982).
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and to avoid harassment lawsuits38 has led the courts to grant com-
plete or qualified immunity to police and prosecutors.
Common law tort claims, such as malicious prosecution and
false imprisonment, suffer from similar inadequacies. A malicious
prosecution claim is presented when a plaintiff can show "the initi-
ation of an action or proceeding that terminated in favor of the
plaintiff, lack of probable cause for the prior action or proceeding,
malice and special injury."* Similarly, "a plaintiff claiming false ar-
rest must show, inter alia, that the defendant intentionally confined
him without his consent and without justification."4' Because ac-
tions for malicious prosecution and false imprisonment both
require a showing of intent on the part of the government, as well
as an absence of probable cause for the arrest, and are limited by
the same immunity protections as § 1983 claims, they are exceed-
ingly difficult to maintain.
38. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422-25 ("The common-law immunity of a pros-
ecutor is based [partially] upon the ... concern that harassment by unfounded litigation
would cause a deflection of the prosecutor's energies from his public duties ... . The public
trust of the prosecutor's office would suffer if he were constrained in making every decision
by the consequences in terms of his own potential liability in a suit for damages. Such suits
could be expected with some frequency, for a defendant often will transform his resentment
at being prosecuted into the ascription of improper and malicious actions to the State's
advocate.").
39. The Supreme Court has held that "government officials performing discretionary
functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known," Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, and that "in initiating a prosecution
and in presenting the State's case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages
under § 1983," Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431.
40. Fink v. Shawangunk Conservancy, Inc., 790 N.Y.S.2d 249, 250 (App. Div. 2005) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted); see also Bernhard, supra note 34, at 86 ("In order to
establish a malicious prosecution, claimants must prove not simply that they were arrested
and prosecuted and that the proceeding was eventually terminated in their favor, but also
that there was no probable cause for their arrest in the first place and that they were prose-
cuted with actual malice.").
41. Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996). While malicious prosecution and
false arrest claims share common elements, the main difference lies in the scope of the
remedy available under each. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484 (1994) (noting that
while recovery for false arrest covers only "the time of detention up until issuance of process
or arraignment, . . . a successful malicious prosecution plaintiff may recover, in addition to
general damages, compensation for any arrest or imprisonment, including damages for
discomfort or injury to his health, or loss of time and deprivation of the society" (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
42. See Garrett, supra note 9, at 51 ("So long as police can credibly show that they had
probable cause, any violation of a suspect's rights are [sic] rendered nonactionable."); Mar-
tinez, supra note 5, at 531 ("Such claims are therefore typically unsuccessful because police
can usually credibly testify that they had probable cause."); see also DanielJ. Meltzer, Harmless
Error and Constitutional Remedies, 61 U. CHi. L. REV. 1, 30-31 (1994) ("[W]hatever its hypo-
thetical merits or demerits, a vigorous system of tort remedies does not exist. The scope of
governmental liability is quite limited, and judges and prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity
from damages liability." (footnotes omitted)).
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Even if a wrongfully convicted claimant were able to succeed on
a claim under § 1983 or a common law tort remedy, a favorable
judgment takes years to recover, leaving the wrongfully convicted
individual to front the costs of yet additional litigation while strug-
gling to survive on whatever income he or she is fortunate enough
to obtain.43
A. Private Legislation
An alternative course of compensation for a wrongfully convict-
ed individual is to seek a private bill from the state legislature,
which can allocate money to the individual. This method presents
its own unique obstacles. As an initial matter, a number of states
interpret their constitutions as precluding this type of recovery." In
addition, state legislatures simply are not equipped to handle the
growing number of wrongfully convicted individuals that are seek-
ing compensation-state legislatures do not have the time or
resources to examine, debate, and vote on compensation for nu-
merous individuals each year, which is likely one reason this
remedy has been used so sparingly.45 Finally, a compensation bill is
vulnerable to the same political infirmities as any piece of legisla-
tion, making a determination of which wrongfully convicted
individual to compensate a function of the political climate of the
day. 46 Positive publicity surrounding the exoneration, the political
connections of the exoneree, and budgetary concerns all are much
more likely to determine the fate of the bill than the merits of the
claim for compensation .47 This not only impairs the individual's
pursuit of redress, it also "can lead to charges of influence, political
43. See Betty Ginsberg, Out with the New, in with the Old: The Importance of Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act to Prisoners with Disabilities, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 713, 724 (2009).
44. Bernhard, supra note 34, at 94.
45. N.Y. LAw REVISION COMM'N, REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION TO THE
GOVERNOR ON REDRESS FOR INNOCENT PERSONS UNJUSTLY CONVICTED AND SUBSEQUENTLY
IMPRISONED 18 (1984), reprinted in N.Y. LAw REVISION COMM'N, REPORT OF THE LAw REVI-
SION COMMISSION FOR 1984, at 36, 55 (1984) ("[T]he Legislature does not seem to be a
suitable body for determining questions of innocence."). In New York, only five private bills
were passed in the state legislature in the thirty-seven years leading up to the enactment of
the state's compensation statute. Baba-Ali v. State, 878 N.Y.S.2d 555, 561 n.3 (Ct. Cl. 2009).
46. See Lopez, supra note 7, at 699-700.
47. Id. For example, Wilton Dedge, who served 22 years in prison after being wrongful-
ly convicted of battery and burglary, was eventually awarded $2 million by the Florida state
legislature. However, the first time the bill was raised, the speaker blocked it from a vote.
Only later did he allow a vote and vote for it himself. Carrie Johnson & Steve Bousquet, Man
Gets $2M for 22 Years He Lost, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, December 9, 2005, at IB, available at
http://www.sptimes.com/2005/12/09/State/Man-gets_2Mfor_22_ye.shtml.
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power, etc., that create an appearance of impropriety and under-
mine the integrity of the legislative process."48
B. Compensation Statutes
Given the difficulties faced by a wrongfully convicted individual
who attempts to recover compensation through civil rights, common
law tort, or legislative remedies, a number of states have enacted
compensation statutes to bridge the gap. These statutes have been
enacted "amid heightened awareness of instances of erroneous con-
viction, and growing interest in providing new legal remedies for
persons exonerated after serving time in prison, " and "set forth
criteria for a recovery which would be easier to establish than negli-
gence on behalf of the government.,5 0
Of the twenty-nine jurisdictions that have enacted compensation
statutes-twenty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and the
federal goverment'-all permit recovery even in the absence of
any government culpability (addressing the primary obstacle pre-
sented by civil rights and common law tort remedies) and all are
available to anyone who meets certain eligibility requirements, re-
gardless of political connections (dealing with the issues presented
by private legislative bills).
The decision to dispense with the government culpability re-
quirement has been explained through the theory that the entire
community benefits from the criminal justice system, and therefore
when a mistake occurs (i.e., a wrongful conviction) the cost should
be borne by the community at large, not individually by the victim
of the mistake. As Edwin Borchard stated almost seventy years ago:
We have recognized, in certain spheres of activity, that it is un-
fair to the individuals injured that they alone should bear the
entire loss resulting from the accident, and therefore society
distributes the loss among its members. Where the common
interest is joined for a common end-maintaining the public
peace by the prosecution of crime--each individual member
being subject to the same danger (erroneous conviction), the
48. N.Y. LAW REvISION COMM'N, supra note 45, at 18.
49. Guzman v. Commonwealth, 907 N.E.2d 1140, 1141-42 (Mass. App. Ct. 2009).
50. In re Estate of Hernandez, 715 N.Y.S.2d 627, 629 (Surr. Ct. 2000).
51. The states that have enacted a compensation statute are: Alabama, California,
Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
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loss when it occurs should be borne by the community as a
whole and not by the injured individual alone. 2
Compensation statutes, however, also implicate several concerns.
Although the number of states that have enacted such statutes con-
tinues to grow rapidly, almost half of the states still have yet to
adopt one. Moreover, "[c]ompensation amounts vary, as do caps
on total compensation available," and the statutes "typically erect
a network of obstacles to recovery that most litigants find virtually
impenetrable." One of the most significant problems raised by
compensation statutes is that succeeding on such a claim is too dif-
ficult and takes too long for a wrongfully convicted individual
deserving of compensation. Meritorious claims often are defeated
due to the substantial burden facing litigants-including the costs
of litigation and the difficulty of producing evidence related to a
crime that took place years ago. Even where a claimant does
succeed, the action takes years to litigate, leaving the wrongfully
convicted individual without any money during that period. The
suggested reforms to date-removing caps on damages and loosen-
ing eligibility restrictions-may open the door to a wider class of
claimants and may increase the amount of damages attained by the
small number of successful claimants, but these suggestions do
nothing to address the contentious and protracted litigation that
precedes, and often precludes, such an award.
III. COMPENSATION STATUTES: A CLOSER LOOK
AT THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK
This section more closely examines the current statutory frame-
work for compensating the wrongfully convicted by breaking down
the statutes in the jurisdictions that have enacted them. There are
five components of these statutes that impact whether and how
52. Edwin Borchard, State Indemnity for Errors of riminal justice, 21 B.U. L. REv. 201,
208 (1941); see also Martinez, supra note 5, at 537 ("Ifwe instead accept that wrongful convic-
tions are endemic to our criminal justice system, the task then becomes one of devising a
system which provides compensation to those who will suffer from the inevitable wrongful
convictions. Such a system would redistribute the cost from the individual to the society as a
whole, as the cost of having an admittedly less-than-perfect criminal justice system." (foot-
note omitted)). Another argument in favor of government compensation rests on the
notion that wrongful convictions are, in essence, a government "taking" that requires just
compensation. See id. at 538 (discussing just compensation jurisprudence).
53. Ravenell, supra note 28, at 698-99.
54. Martinez, supra note 5, at 515.
55. Bernhard, supra note 34, at 101-08.
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much a wrongfully convicted person can recover: standing (i.e.,
eligibility requirements), disqualification provisions, caps on dam-
ages, statutes of limitations, and the burden of proof.
A. Eligibility Requirements
Almost all of the existing compensation statutes limit redress to
a certain category of wrongfully convicted individuals. Unless the
claimant meets these eligibility requirements, he or she does not
have standing to sue and the claim will be dismissed.
One type of eligibility requirement in some statutes restricts ac-
cess based on the nature of the underlying crime for which the
claimant was convicted. Nearly half (thirteen) of the jurisdictions
that have compensation statutes only allow a claimant to obtain
redress if he or she was convicted of a felony.16 Three permit claim-
ants to proceed based on convictions of a misdemeanor or a felo-
felony. The remaining thirteen jurisdictions permit actions for
any conviction, regardless of the nature of the crime."
A second eligibility requirement relates to the duration and the
nature of the incarceration. All jurisdictions require that the
claimant have served time in prison, with Massachusetts requiring
that the claimant have served no less than one year in prison."
Most states also do not permit a claimant to sue under the com-
pensation statute if the claimant was concurrently serving time in
prison for another offense for which the claimant was guilty or if
the claimant is serving time in prison for, or is later convicted of,
*60another crime.
The most significant eligibility requirement restricts a claimant's
ability to pursue a compensation claim based on the circumstances
by which the claimant was released from prison. Four states only
permit a claimant to seek relief if the individual has been par-
doned by the governor.6 ' Three states permit suit only if the
56. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 4900 (West 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 961.02 (West 2010).
57. IOWA CODE ANN. § 663A.1 (West 2010); N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTS LAW § 8-b (McKinney
2010); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a (LexisNexis 2009).
58. E.g., 28 U.S.C. 2513 (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102uu (West 2009); D.C.
CODE § 2-421 (2001).
59. MASS. GEN. LAWs ch. 258D, § 1(C) (2009).
60. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 961.04 (West 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-6 (West 2001).
61. These states are Maine, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8241 (1996), Maryland, MD.
CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 10-501 (LexisNexis 2009), North Carolina, N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 148-82 (West 2009), and Tennessee (which provides compensation in the
event of a grant of pardon or exoneration by the governor), TENN. CODE. ANN. § 9-8-
108(a) (7) (2009). New Hampshire previously limited recovery to only those individuals who
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claimant was exonerated by DNA evidence." Nine states allow ac-
tions by claimants who were released on grounds of innocence or
grounds consistent with innocence. Nine states, the District of
Columbia, and the federal government require only that the con-
viction has been reversed or vacated and the claimant was either
not retried or was retried and acquitted." And two states do not
have any restrictions on who can bring a claim.
There are advantages and disadvantages to the limits placed on
claimants based on the grounds for their relief. Drawing the eligi-
bility requirements too narrowly precludes recovery for innocent
individuals who were wrongfully convicted. Drawing them too
broadly opens up the state to nuisance lawsuits that will cost it pre-
cious time and resources. Thus, the pardon requirement makes it
very likely that the individual being awarded compensation is, in
fact, innocent of the crime for which he or she was convicted. At
the same time, it is unlikely that a governor's office-already over-
burdened with the rigors of running the state-has the time and
resources to actively investigate all cases of wrongful conviction and
make a determination purely based on merits as to who deserves to
be pardoned. Instead, pardons are granted to a small subset of in-
received a pardon, but the statute was amended in 1996 to cover all individuals that were
granted relief on the basis of innocence. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 541-B:14 (2007).
62. These states are Missouri, Mo. REv. STAT. § 650.058 (2007), Montana, MoNT.
CODE ANN. § 53-1-214 (2009), and Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5574 (2009).
63. These states are Alabama, 2001 ALA. ACTS 659, California, CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 4900 (West 2010), Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102uu (West 2009), Florida,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 961.04 (West 2010), New Hampshire, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 541-B:14
(2007), Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 154 (2001), Texas, TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 103.001 (Vernon 2009), Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-405 (2008), and Virginia,
VA. CODE. ANN. § 8.01-195.10 (2007).
64. There is some variation among the eleven jurisdictions. Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 663A.1 (West 2010), Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8 (2010), Massachusetts,
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258D, § 1(B) (LexisNexis 2009), Mississippi, Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-44-7
(2009), Nebraska, NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 29-4603 (LexisNexis 2009), and Ohio, OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2743.48 (LexisNexis 2008), permit recovery if the individual's conviction was
vacated or dismissed, or was reversed, and no further proceedings can be or will be held
against the individual on any facts and circumstances alleged in the proceedings which had
resulted in the conviction. Illinois, 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-702 (West 2009), New
York, N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTS LAW § 8-b (McKinney 2010), and West Virginia, W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 14-2-13a (LexisNexis 2009), use essentially the same language but also provide relief if the
statute, or application thereof, on which the indictment or information was based violated
the Constitution of the United States or the constitution of their state. The District of Co-
lumbia, D.C. CODE § 2-422 (2006), and the federal government, 28 U.S.C. § 2513
(a) (1) (2006), provide access to claimants who have their conviction reversed or set aside,
but specify that it be on the ground that they are not guilty of the offense of which they were
convicted, or on new trial or rehearing was found not guilty of such offense, as appears from
the record or certificate of the court setting aside or reversing such conviction.
65. These states are NewJersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-2 (West 2001), and Wisconsin,
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 775.05 (West 2009).
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dividuals who receive the most publicity and public support,66 mak-
ing pardons vulnerable to the same infirmities as private legislative
compensation bills.
Like the pardon requirement, requiring that the claimant have
been exonerated by DNA evidence ensures that the claimant is actu-
ally innocent, but also limits redress to a subset of innocent
individuals. While such a requirement is not subject to the same po-
litical influences as a pardon requirement, most cases do not even
involve evidence that is DNA-testable, and therefore it precludes
many innocent individuals from receiving compensation.
Permitting suits by those individuals who have received judicial
relief on the basis of innocence or grounds consistent with inno-
cence broadens relief to a larger class of individuals than those
pardoned by the governor or exonerated by DNA evidence. How-
ever, such a requirement still is under-inclusive of all innocent
individuals who are wrongfully convicted because it makes recovery
contingent on whether a court declares the individual innocent-a
finding that many courts prefer not to reach, and one they need
not reach in order to overturn the conviction.
The requirement that the claimant's conviction have been re-
versed or vacated and he or she was either released or retried and
acquitted-which has been adopted by a plurality of the jurisdictions
that have compensation statutes-is both under- and over-inclusive.
On the one hand, an innocent individual could be released from
prison on grounds other than a reversal and dismissal of the indict-
ment or a new trial and acquittal, but under most of the statutes in
this category such a claimant could not bring an action. On the oth-
er hand, a guilty individual could have a new trial ordered on a legal
technicality, and at the new trial the jury does not convict. However,
a finding that a defendant is not guilty beyond a reasonable doubt is
quite different from a finding that the defendant is innocent.
Lastly, the two states that permit anyone to bring an action for
compensation based on wrongful conviction, regardless of the
grounds upon which they were released from prison, open the
door to meritless lawsuits by individuals who were rightfully con-
victed and who are merely hoping to exact a nuisance settlement.
66. See, e.g., Bernhard, supra note 34, at 102.
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B. The Requirement that a Claimant Not Have "Caused or
Contributed" to His or Her Conviction
A number of compensation statutes also contain a disqualifica-
tion provision that precludes recovery for certain claimants. While
a number of statutes include these disqualifying factors in their
eligibility requirements, others permit the action to proceed past
the pleading stage but place the burden on the claimant to estab-
lish that he or she does not fall under the scope of the
disqualifying factor. The most common disqualification provi-
sion-present in roughly half of the current compensation
statutes-precludes recovery if the claimant in some way caused or
67contributed to his or her conviction.
In a number of states, this disqualifying provision is narrowly tai-
lored to preclude recovery only if the claimant pled guilty,
committed or suborned perjury, fabricated evidence, or otherwise
made a false statement that contributed to the conviction." Other
statutes contain broader language that covers any conduct by a
claimant who, by his or her own conduct, caused or brought about
the conviction." This broader language encompasses the specific
conduct covered in the more limited provisions-pleading guilty,
suborning perjury, fabricating evidence, or making a false state-
ment-but also captures additional conduct. For example, in New
York, a jurisdiction that requires the claimant to prove that he or
she did not "cause or bring about his [or her] conviction,', 70 the
claimant cannot prevail if he or she attempted to protect the guilty
party by concealing evidence to protect that person. In Stevenson v.
67. As of yet, no jurisdiction has adopted a comparative fault scheme for recovery,
which would limit, rather than bar altogether, compensation for a wrongfully convicted
individual who contributed to his or her own conviction. For a discussion of the comparative
fault system in the context of wrongful conviction compensation, see generally Adam 1.
Kaplan, Comment, The Case for Comparative Fault in Compensating the Wrongfully Convicted, 56
UCLA L. REV. 227 (2008).
68. E.g., D.C. CODE § 2-425 (2006) (did not plead guilty); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-
4603 (LexisNexis 2009) (did not commit or suborn perjury, fabricate evidence, or otherwise
make a false statement to cause or bring about the conviction).
69. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 4903 (West 2010) (did not intentionally contribute to ar-
rest or conviction); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a (LexisNexis 2009) (did not by own conduct
cause or bring about conviction). Although Tennessee's compensation statute does not
contain a disqualifying provision of this sort, it does state that "[t]he state of Tennessee shall
have a right of subrogation as provided by law for any amount awarded pursuant to this
subdivision (a) (7) against any person who willfully and intentionally committed an act or
engaged in conduct that directly resulted in or contributed to the wrongful conviction and
imprisonment of the claimant." TENN. CODE. ANN. § 9-8-108(a)(7)(G) (2009). Presumably,
if the claimant intentionally committed an act that contributed to his or her own conviction,
the state would be able to avoid liability.
70. N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTs LAW § 8-b (McKinney 2010).
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State, the claimant had been wrongfully convicted, but had deliber-
ately shielded from prosecution his identical twin brother who had
actually committed the crime.n According to the trial court, the
" [c] laimant's failure to come forward at any time and his complete
failure to mitigate by silence [was] precisely the type of disqualify-
ing circumstance contemplated" by the legislature when it enacted
New York's compensation statute. Similarly, in Taylor v. State, the
claimant did not satisfy his burden of proving he did not contrib-
ute to his own conviction when he withheld information
implicating his wife in order to protect her.
The record clearly demonstrates that claimant either pos-
sessed incriminating knowledge or at least suspected that his
wife was involved in this crime, that the decision not to call
her was made by claimant, not defense counsel, and not for
the purpose of advancing his own cause but instead to aid and
to protect his wife. In our view, these facts remove this case
from the realm of mere trial strategy and place it more in the
area of withholding potentially exculpatory information.4
Even the broadly styled disqualification provisions are unlikely
to reach ineffective trial strategy or an unsuccessful defense at the
criminal trial. In 0 Donnell v. State, the New York appellate division
held that the "cause or contribute" requirement did not bar a
claimant from recovering simply because he had put on an alibi
defense at his criminal trial that was not believed by the jury.
If the mere proffer of a disbelieved but not disproven alibi is
deemed to constitute conduct that causes or brings about a
wrongful conviction, Court of Claims Act § 8-b would, in ef-
fect, be of very little benefit to innocent defendants who
unsuccessfully offer at trial any kind of affirmative and truth-
ful evidence of innocence.... A claimant may not be
penalized for decisions that fall within the realm of reasona-
ble and legitimate trial strategy.
71. 520 N.Y.S.2d 492 (Ct. Cl. 1987).
72. Id. at 494.
73. 605 N.Y.S.2d 172 (App. Div. 1993), affd, Williams v. State, 661 N.E.2d 1381 (N.Y.
1995).
74. Id. at 174.
75. 808 N.Y.S.2d 266 (App. Div. 2005).
76. Id. at 270-71 (internal citation omitted).
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Instead, the court held that the disqualification provision is meant
to apply to "claimant's knowing withholding of available, admissi-
ble, and material exculpatory evidence, or his or her knowing
presentation of evidence that is provably false through evidence
independent of proof of guilt.""
Even though some jurisdictions expressly state that coerced con-
fessions and involuntary or invalid guilty pleas do not stand as a
barrier to recovery," it is not clear that all other jurisdictions would
take the same view if confronted with such a case.
C. Caps on the Recovery ofDamages
The amount of damages available under compensation statutes
generally is smaller than the amount available under § 1983 civil
rights and common law tort claims, a logical tradeoff given that a
claimant under a compensation statute need not prove culpability
on the part of the government. Thus, a number of compensation
statutes place a cap on the amount of damages that can be recov-
ered by a claimant.
Many states place limits on the amount of damages that can be
recovered per year in prison, ranging from $5,000 per year in Wis-
consin79 to $80,000 per year in Texas.80 The majority of jurisdictions
that place annual caps on damages-Alabama, Florida, Mississippi,
North Carolina, and the federal government-limit the amount to
$50,000 per year in prison."' Louisiana, New Jersey, and Ohio all
contain a lower cap on damages, Vermont contains a higher
77. Id. at 271. However, it is possible that other courts could interpret these disqualifi-
cation provisions more broadly than the courts in the cases described supra notes 71-76,
perhaps even barring recovery where the claimant testified unpersuasively at the criminal
trial.
78. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 4903 (West 2010); D.C. CODE § 2-425 (2006); NEB.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 29-4603 (LexisNexis 2009).
79. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 775.05 (West 2009). Wisconsin, however, does allow the claims
board to recommend to the legislature an additional amount if it finds that "the amount it is
able to award is not an adequate compensation." Id.
80. TEX. CIv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.052 (Vernon 2009). The federal gov-
ernment provides for a $50,000 per year limit for non-death row inmates and a $100,000 per
year limit on death row inmates. 28 U.S.C. § 2513(e) (2006).
81. 28 U.S.C. § 2513(e) (2006); 2001 ALA. ACTS 659; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 961.06 (West
2010); Miss. CODE. ANN. § 11-44-7 (2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 148-84 (West 2009). In
addition to $50,000 per year of incarceration, Alabama permits a supplemental award to be
obtained through a bill presented to the Legislature "if circumstances warrant such a sup-
plemental award." 2001 ALA. ACTS 659. Mississippi also awards attorney's fees, not to be
deducted from the amount awarded to the claimant. MISS. CODE. ANN. § 11-44-7.
82. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8 (2010) ($15,000 per year); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-
5 (West 2001) ($20,000 per year); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48 (LexisNexis 2008)
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one,8 3 and Utah and Virginia both base the annual amount on the
state's average income or payroll.84 A number of jurisdictions-
including some that place annual caps on damages-contain caps
on the total amount of compensation that an individual can recov-
er. Most of these caps on total damages are in the six-figures, but
New Hampshire and Wisconsin limit the maximum amount of
damages to $20,000 and $25,000, respectively,"6 while Tennessee
and Florida permit damages up to $1 million and $2 million, re-
spectively. "' A small minority of states-California, Iowa, and
Missouri-compensate a successful claimant either $100 or $50 for
each day spent in prison.
Only six jurisdictions place no cap on damages." New York and
West Virginia simply provide that "[i]f the court finds that the
claimant is entitled to a judgment, it shall award damages in such
sum of money as the court determines will fairly and reasonably
compensate him."90 Connecticut offers more guidance, stating that
the amount of damages shall be based upon evidence of "loss of
liberty and enjoyment of life, loss of earnings, loss of earning ca-
pacity, loss of familial relationships, loss of reputation, physical
pain and suffering, mental pain and suffering and attorney's fees
and other expenses arising from or related to such person's arrest,
prosecution, conviction and incarceration."9' Unlike the other
compensation statutes, and contrary to the strict liability nature of
these statutes, Connecticut also permits the court to consider
"whether any negligence or misconduct by any officer, agent,
($40,330 per year). Ohio also awards damages for lost wages and any fines or penalties aris-
ing out of the wrongful conviction. Id.
83. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5574 (2009) (providing for no less than $30,000 and no
more than $60,000 per year). Vermont also compensates for lost wages, health coverage,
psychological treatment, and reasonable attorney's fees. Id.
84. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-405 (2008) (the monetary equivalent of the average an-
nual nonagricultural payroll wage in Utah); VA. CODE. ANN. § 8.01-195.11 (2007) (an
amount equal to 90% of the Virginia per capita personal income). Virginia also provides up
to $10,000 for educational tuition. Id.
85. E.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8 (2010) ($150,000 total); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 14, § 8242 (2009) ($300,000 total).
86. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 541-B:14 (2007); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 775.05 (West 2009).
87. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 9-8-108(a) (7) (2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 961.04 (West 2010).
88. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4904 (West 2010) ($100); IOWA CODE ANN. § 663A.1 (West
2010) ($50); Mo. REV. STAT. § 650.058 (2007) ($50). Iowa also provides lost wages, attor-
neys' fees, and any fines or penalties paid by the individual in connection with the wrongful
conviction. IOWA CODE ANN. § 663A.1 (West 2010).
89. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102uu(c) (West 2009); D.C. CODE § 2-423
(2006).
90. N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTs LAW § 8-b (McKinney 2010); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a
(LexisNexis 2009).
91. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102uu(c) (West 2009).
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employee or official of the state or any political subdivision of the
state contributed to [the claimant's] arrest, prosecution, conviction
or incarceration."0
In addition to the compensatory damages awarded for emotion-
al and economic harm, six jurisdictions also cover expenses for
employment training, educational tuition, and/or medical cover-
93age.
While a small number of state compensation statutes restrict
damages to an extremely low amount-New Hampshire and
Wisconsin limit total damages to an amount lower than many states
provide for each year in prison9 4-the caps on damages in most
jurisdictions are reasonable and provide those jurisdictions assur-
ance that they will not be forced unexpectedly to pay an exorbitant
sum of money from the state's annual budget.
D. Statutes of Limitations
The competing interests raised by the statute of limitations peri-
od are, on the one hand, to protect the state from unduly delayed
claims--which both undermine the state's ability to budget for its
expected liabilities and increase the likelihood that relevant evi-
dence is lost or discarded-and, on the other hand, the wrongfully
convicted claimant's need for sufficient time to file suit. Like dam-
age caps, statutes of limitations are utilized by a number of states to
balance other components of the wrongful conviction statutes.
Generally, the more restrictive the eligibility requirements, the
longer the claimant has to bring the action.
A majority of the compensation statutes require the wrongfully
convicted individual to file his or her claim within two years. Five
jurisdictions offer less time-the District of Columbia, Oklahoma,
92. Id. § 54-102uu(d).
93. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 961.06 (West 2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8 (2010).
94. Until recently, the federal government provided only $5,000 for each year in pris-
on. In 2003, however, Congress enacted the Innocence Protection Act, which increased the
limit to $50,000 for each year in prison for non-death row inmates and $100,000 for each
year a prisoner spent on death row. 28 U.S.C. § 2513 (2006). This may be a harbinger for
other states as well. For example, in its final report, the California Commission on the Fair
Administration of Justice recommended "that the level of statutory compensation be in-
creased, at least to the level of comparable federal compensation ($50,000 per year
maximum)." CAL. COMM'N, FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 105.
95. See, e.g., John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133 (2008);
United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 608 (1990) (noting that a statute of limitations is part of
a bargain for the government to agree to waive sovereign immunity).
96. E.g., 2001 ALA. ACTs 659; CAL. PENAL CODE § 4901 (West 2010).
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and Tennessee provide for only one year,7 and Wisconsin requires
a claimant to file notice with the state within 120 days." Four state
statutes-Mississippi, New Hampshire, Texas, and Vermont-
contain a three-year statute of limitations period."
Two or three years strikes that balance so long as the wrongfully
convicted individual is aware that he or she is permitted to seek
compensation from the state.1oo
E. The Burden of Proof
The aim of the compensation statutes is to compensate innocent
individuals who were wrongfully convicted. Consequently, in order
to recover, these statutes demand some proof of innocence. Most
jurisdictions require that claimants prove their innocence either by
a preponderance of the evidence.o. or by clear and convincing evi-
dence.102 Although the statutes in the remaining jurisdictions do
not specify the standard by which the claimant must carry his or
her burden, they contain eligibility requirements that confer stand-
ing only if the claimant has been pardoned by the governor,
exonerated by DNA evidence, or found innocent by a court,' or
make clear that it is the claimant's burden to prove his or her in-
104nocence.
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF PROOF
TO THE STATE TO PROVE CLAIMANT'S GUILT
The current statutory framework, although a major step towards
adequate compensation of the wrongfully convicted, still leaves the
majority of wrongfully convicted individuals without redress and
97. D.C. CODE § 12-309 (2001); OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 156 (2001); TENN. CODE. ANN.
§ 9-8-108 (2009).
98. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.80 (West 2009).
99. E.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-44-9 (2009); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 541-B:14 (2007).
100. Currently, most jurisdictions rely on the wrongfully convicted individuals to ac-
quaint themselves with the available remedies or on attorneys, willing to take the case on a
contingency fee basis, to inform the individuals of their options. If states deem these meth-
ods insufficient-i.e., that wrongfully convicted individuals being released from prison are
not learning of their potential remedies-the states could provide notice to these individu-
als upon their release.
101. E.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-44-7 (2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5574 (2009); Ellis
v. State, 596 N.E.2d 428, 431 (Ohio 1992).
102. D.C. CODE § 2-422 (2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 961.03 (West 2010).
103. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
104. 28 U.S.C. § 2513 (2006); CAL. PENAL CODE § 4903 (West 2010).
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forces these individuals to front the cost of litigation, present evi-
dence that they do not possess, and prove a negative-that they did
not commit a crime-regarding an event that took place years ear-
lier. As a result, many meritorious claims are dismissed, settled for
too little, or never brought in the first place. This section examines
the implications of shifting the burden of proof on the issue of in-
nocence to the state as a possible solution to this problem. There
are several justifications for shifting the burden and several com-
pelling concerns associated with doing so. However, these concerns
could be addressed effectively through checks already built into
the justice system, careful drafting of statutory eligibility require-
ments, and resort to a reasonable cap on damages.
A. Inability of the Current Statutory Framework to Adequately
Compensate the Wrongfully Convicted
Despite the introduction of compensation statutes by twenty-
seven states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government,
the majority of wrongfully convicted individuals have been unable
to collect any compensation.'o For the successful minority, the
compensation still takes years to recover and at high expense-an
expense that most wrongfully convicted individuals are unable to
pay.
There has not been an abundance of wrongful conviction com-
pensation lawsuits in the states that have enacted statutes, and even
fewer that have made it to trial, but of the claims that have, there
have been only a handful of occasions where the claimant was un-
able to carry his or her burden.o' However, it is difficult to draw
105. BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS To ExECUTION, AND OTHER
DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 230 (2000) ("[O]nly 37% of the wrongfully
convicted received compensation."); Garrett, supra note 3, at 120 ("To date most exonerees
have not obtained civil compensation for injuries suffered. Eighty-two (41%) have thus far
received some kind of compensation for their years of imprisonment for crimes they did not
commit, according to news reports located for most of the 200 exonerees."); Martinez, supra
note 5, at 515 ("Exonerees, however, typically recover nothing for the harm caused by their
wrongful conviction and incarceration. Instead, they are set free to be poor: their common
law claims are defeated by sovereign immunity doctrine, statutes providing for relief typically
erect a network of obstacles to recovery that most litigants find virtually impenetrable, and
their constitutional civil rights claims shatter against the barriers of governmental immunity
and causation doctrines.").
106. See Tennison v. Cal. Victim Comp. & Gov't Claims Bd., 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 88, 110 (Ct.
App. 2007) ("As discussed above, substantial evidence supports the Board's determination
Tennison failed to carry his burden of proof."); Vasquez v. State, 693 N.Y.S.2d 220, 221
(App. Div. 1999) ("Contrary to the claimant's contentions, her conclusory and self-serving
testimony failed to carry her 'heavy burden' of demonstrating, by clear and convincing evi-
dence, that she did not commit the crimes charged in the accusatory instrument." (internal
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any inferences from this fact. On the one hand, if only a handful of
claimants fail to prove their innocence once they get to that stage
of the litigation, one could argue that most individuals suing under
the compensation statute are, in fact, innocent and should not be
forced to front the costs of litigation and wait years before being
compensated for their wrongful conviction. This overlooks the fact
that many individuals are filtered out prior to getting to the stage
of proving their innocence and that shifting the burden to the
state may cause additional claimants-claimants who are, in fact,
guilty-to bring suit as well.
On the other hand, one could argue that if only a handful of
claimants are unable to prove their innocence, then the burden
does not need to be shifted. This, however, overlooks the primary
flaw in the current system-that recovery still takes years, and there
are many other innocent individuals who do not bring suit, settle
early on for too little, or otherwise get filtered out at early stages of
the litigation due to the high costs and heavy burdens of litigating
their claims. For example, the New York Times recently researched
the compensation claims of 206 individuals who had been exoner-
ated by DNA evidence.10' According to the article,
[a]t least 79-nearly 40 percent-got no money for their
years in prison.... More than half of those who did receive
compensation waited two years or longer after exoneration
for the first payment. ... Indeed, despite being imprisoned
for an average of 12 years, they typically left prison with less
help-prerelease counseling, job training, substance-abuse
citation omitted)); Rivers v. State, 609 N.Y.S.2d 253, 254 (App. Div. 1994) ("The trial court's
conclusion that the claimant failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that he had
not criminally possessed a weapon on the date of the shooting is neither against the weight
of the evidence nor contrary to law."); Ellis, 596 N.E.2d at 431 (affirming the finding that
claimant did not satisfy his burden of proving innocence by a preponderance of the evi-
dence); Seiber v. State, No. 81314, 2002 WL 31771250, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2002)
("[W]e find competent, credible evidence to support the court's judgment [that claimant
did not meet his burden by a preponderance of the evidence]."); Chandler v. State, 641
N.E.2d 1382, 1386 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (affirming trial court's conclusion that "appellant
failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the crime was never commit-
ted by anyone or that he did not commit the crime of which he was convicted"); see also Mike
v. State, 11 Misc. 3d 384, 391 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 2005) (granting summary judgment to state be-
cause "claimant is not likely to succeed at trial in establishing that he did not commit any of
the acts charged in the accusatory instrument").
107. Janet Roberts & Elizabeth Stanton, A Long Road Back After Exoneration, and justice Is
Slow to Make Amends, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 25, 2007, at 138, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/11/25/us/25dna.html.
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treatment, housing assistance and other services-than some
states offer to paroled prisoners.'o
The New York Times article only details the struggles of those indi-
viduals who were exonerated by DNA evidence. The road to
redress for someone without scientific proof of their innocence is
often much more difficult.
B. Justifications for Shifting the Burden of Proof to the State
There are several justifications for shifting the burden of proof
to the state on the issue of innocence. First, the state, not the
claimant, most often possesses the evidence related to the crime in
question, and therefore shifting the burden to the state would cre-
ate the incentive to produce that evidence. Second, and relatedly,
due to cost concerns and the difficulty of proving a negative, the
state is in a better position to prove that the claimant did commit
the crime than the claimant is in to prove that he or she did not
commit the crime. Third, shifting the burden to the state removes
the state's incentive and ability to hold the claimant to his or her
burden-and thereby preclude recovery for years-even where
there is overwhelming evidence of innocence and no evidence of
guilt. There also are two less-persuasive arguments for shifting the
burden; namely, shifting the burden to the state would be con-
sistent with the presumption of innocence afforded to defendants
in criminal trials, and shifting the burden to the state might have a
deterrent effect on wrongful convictions.
1. Access to Evidence
It is often the case that one party has "easier access to evidence
than his opponent, meaning he can assemble the appropriate evi-
dence at lower cost than his opponent."'o Where this is the case,
and all else being equal, the burden should be shifted to the party
with the better access to evidence (i.e., the party with the lowest
relative costs of production)." Not surprisingly, then, "[b]urden-
108. Id.
109. Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Economic Per-
spective, 26J. LEGAL STUD. 413, 419 (1997).
110. See id.
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shifting where one party has superior access to evidence on a par-
ticular issue is a common feature of our law.""'
For wrongful conviction civil claims-where the litigated issue is
the commission of a past crime that was investigated and tried by
the state-it is the state that most often has the best access to the
evidence. The convicted individual does not take to prison the bal-
listics and forensic evidence, the victim's and witnesses' statements
and whereabouts, or the case file; this material remains with the
state. If the burden is placed on the claimant, the claimant must
seek discovery of that evidence or seek to obtain the information
independently-both of which may be expensive ventures."2 How-
ever, placing the burden on the state "relieves [the claimant] to
some extent of that task-thereby saving expenditures that might
otherwise be incurred by the [claimant] ."..
Moreover, if the state misplaces or loses the evidence-not an
unlikely occurrence given that convictions often are overturned
years after the criminal trial, and in the case of newly testable DNA
evidence, sometimes decades later-the claimant may not be able
to gather comparable evidence to present at trial. In that case,
placing the burden on the claimant would result in a victory for
the state, effectively penalizing the claimant for something outside
his or her control."4 Shifting the burden to the state has the effect
of penalizing the party that loses the evidence.
2. Ease of Carrying the Burden
Shifting the burden of proof to the state would align the show-
ing of proof required at the criminal trial with the one required at
the later civil trial, and also would relieve the claimant of proving a
negative-that he or she did not commit the crime. Thus, in
111. United States v. One Parcel of Prop. Located at 194 Quaker Farms Rd., Oxford,
Conn., 85 F.3d 985, 990 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 455
(1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("In determining whether the placement of the burden
of proof is fundamentally unfair, relevant considerations include: whether the government
has superior access to evidence."); Nat'l Commc'ns Ass'n v. AT&T Corp., 238 F.3d 124, 130
(2d Cir. 2001) ("[AIll else being equal, the burden is better placed on the party with easier
access to relevant information.").
112. See, e.g., Hay & Spier, supra note 109, at 419 ("Giving the plaintiff the burden of
proof may lead her to demand, and sift through, piles of information that may or may not
contain useful evidence-generating costs that might be avoided if the defendant were giv-
en the burden of proof.").
113. Id. at 413 (emphasis removed).
114. Cf Dixon v. Shalala, 54 F.3d 1019, 1037 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that defendant
state, and not the class members, should be penalized for the destruction of evidence).
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general, it would be easier for the state to prove guilt than it would
be for the claimant to prove innocence.
At a criminal trial, it is the state's burden to prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the defendant is guilty. If that defendant later
brings a civil action against the state for wrongful conviction, re-
quiring the state to prove that that individual is guilty by a
preponderance of the evidence would involve essentially the same
proof that was proffered at the criminal trial-only under a lesser
standard. The state already would be in possession of the evidence
needed to establish the claimant's guilt because the state already
presented that evidence at the criminal trial-as noted supra, the
state has in its control the physical evidence and the names (and,
assuming still current, the whereabouts) of relevant witnesses.115
Moreover, even where the state is unable to locate witnesses or
those witnesses are unable to testify at the civil trial, the state could
rely solely on the criminal trial transcript and still be able to satisfy
its burden."'
The claimant, on the other hand, rarely would be able to satisfy
the burden of proof by relying on the criminal trial transcript.
Even where the claimant has been acquitted at a retrial, that only
establishes that the claimant is not guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, not that he or she is innocent of the crime. Criminal de-
fendants often do not put on a case of innocence, and therefore
the trial transcript would not be as pertinent to a burden that re-
quires a showing of innocence. Instead, the claimant likely would
have to find witnesses and evidence from a crime that occurred
years earlier and then present those witnesses and evidence at trial.
Several states have recognized this difficulty and have stated ex-
115. In fact, the Massachusetts compensation statute instructs the state to notify the vic-
tim of the crime at issue. MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 258D, § 4 (LexisNexis 2009). The victim
"shall be allowed, but may not be compelled, to testify or furnish other evidence." Id.
116. See, e.g., Guzman v. Commonwealth, 907 N.E.2d 1140, 1141-42 (Mass. App. Ct.
2009) ("To be sure, all the evidence relied upon by the parties on the issue of actual inno-
cence, including any inculpatory evidence from the criminal trial that the Commonwealth
may choose to introduce, eventually must be weighed and evaluated to determine whether
the claimant has met his burden of proof and is entitled to recover.").
117. There could be situations where the claimant, at the criminal trial, presented an al-
ibi defense or eyewitnesses who testified to the claimant's innocence. It is possible that the
criminal trial transcript in that case would be sufficient for the claimant to prove his or her
innocence. For example, in State v. Moore, 847 N.E.2d 452, 456 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006), the
claimant
presented only the trial transcript and exhibits from the trial in which a jury found
him not guilty. While the trial transcript supporting a not-guilty verdict may not be
sufficient to support a wrongful imprisonment finding in every case, we hold that it
constituted competent, credible evidence to support such a finding in this case.
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pressly in their compensation statutes that the court may, "in the
interest of justice, give due consideration to difficulties of proof
caused by the passage of time, the death or unavailability of wit-
nesses, the destruction of evidence or other factors not caused by
such persons or those acting on their behalf."" However, in prac-
tice it is difficult to carry out this ethereal guidance."'9 Shifting the
burden of proof to the state would reduce the need for live wit-
nesses at trial (and the associated costs) and would obviate reliance
on witnesses that may no longer remember the crime and evidence
that may no longer exist.
Shifting the burden to the state also would relieve the claimant
of the awkward chore of proving a negative-that he or she did not
commit the crime. In other contexts, courts have shifted the bur-
den to the defendant where the failure to do so would require the
plaintiff to prove a negative.12 0 Indeed, "all else ... being equal,
courts should avoid requiring a party to shoulder the more difficult
task of proving a negative."' 2' While proving that the claimant
committed the crime at issue is a feat that the state already has ac-
complished before and one that involves linking evidence to a
known individual, proving innocence forces a claimant to reex-
amine and investigate the crime to determine who actually
committed it.
Commentators and courts alike note that wrongful conviction
compensation suits "are notoriously difficult to litigate given the
118. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-1 (West 2001); N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTS LAw § 8-b(1) (McKin-
ney 2010); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a (LexisNexis 2009).
119. See, e.g., Reed v. State, 574 N.E.2d 433, 438 (N.Y. 1991) ("While the Legislature
specified that courts should 'give due consideration to difficulties of proof caused by the
passage of time, the death or unavailability of witnesses, the destruction of evidence or other
factors not caused by such persons,' it also allocated to claimants the heavy burden of prov-
ing their innocence by clear and convincing proof." (quoting N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTS LAW § 8-
b(1) (McKinney 2010)).
120. See, e.g., United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, 191 F.3d 30, 40 (1st Cir. 1999) (shifting
the burden of proof to the defendant on the issue of personal jurisdiction because otherwise
the plaintiff would be required "to prove a negative fifty times over-an epistemological
quandary which is compounded by the fact that the defendant typically controls much of
the information needed to determine the existence and/or magnitude of its contacts with
any given jurisdiction"); Fara Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Fara Estates, Ltd., No. 96-17338,
1998 WL 10744, at *6 (9th Cir. Jan. 9, 1998) ("Thus, in those cases where the court has given
some consideration to the burden of proof requirements, either implicitly or explicitly, the
burden has been placed on the defendant to show that the plaintiff had the requisite
knowledge of facts . . . . Further supporting such an allocation is the fact that the alternative
allocation would require the plaintiff to prove a negative, i.e., to prove that it lacked
knowledge of certain facts.")
121. Nat'1 Commc'ns Ass'n v. AT&T Corp., 238 F.3d 124, 131 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Vi-
eth v.Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 311 (2004) (Kennedy,J., concurring) ("[P]roving a negative is
a challenge in any context."); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960) ("[A]s a prac-
tical matter it is never easy to prove a negative.")
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absence of a method to prove innocence to a degree of scientific
certainty."122 In Reed v. State, the trial court had awarded damages to
the claimant despite her inability to produce sufficient evidence to
demonstrate her innocence, and expressed concern that no
"claimant could ever prove innocence by clear and convincing evi-
dence except in the instance where another person confesses to
the crime and such confession is accepted by the judicial authori-
ties."123 New York's highest court reversed the judgment and stated
that "such damages actions were not expected to succeed frequent-
ly.... The [Law Revision] Commission anticipated that most
claims asserted under section 8-b would be dismissed before tri-
al." 124
Due to the difficulty of proving innocence, even where the
claimant is factually innocent, he or she may fail to carry the bur-
den, settle the case for a reduced amount, or even decide against
filing a claim at all.125 Because it would be easier for the state to
prove guilt than it would be for the claimant to prove innocence,
these same risks are less likely to plague the state if it had the bur-
den of proof.
3. Inducing Settlement Where Appropriate
Another benefit of shifting the burden of proof to the state
would be to save judicial resources and prevent an innocent indi-
vidual, already wronged by the system, from fronting the costs of
litigation and enduring a protracted adversarial process. By placing
the burden on the claimant, even where there is overwhelming
proof of innocence, and even where the state does not have a sin-
gle piece of evidence to rebut the claimant's case, the claimant
must proceed through years of litigation-including discovery, mo-
tion practice, and trial-before obtaining an award that still may be
the subject of appeal.
This is evidenced by several examples. In Vera v. State,
[n]o witnesses took the stand at the 8-b trial to testify that [the
claimant] was part of the ... robbery; defendant rested with-
122. Medwed, supra note 8, at 356-57.
123. 574 N.E.2d at 437 (quoting Reed v. State, 497 N.Y.S.2d 274, 279 (Ct. Cl. 1985)).
124. Id.; see also U.S. v. Graham, 595 F. Supp. 2d 681, 684 (S.D. W. Va. 2008) ("There are
few reported cases that discuss [the federal compensation statute] § 2513. The paucity of
case law under the statute suggests that it is a remedy that is rarely pursued successfully. It is
rarely used, this court believes, because few applicants can satisfy its rigorous standard.").
125. See Bruce L. Hay, Allocating the Burden ofProof 72 INo. L.J. 651, 655 (1997).
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out putting on a case. Nor was any physical evidence present-
ed linking claimant to the crime, such as fingerprints, fiber
evidence or ownership of one of the guns that was brandished
at the apartment.1 2 6
Mr. Vera's conviction was vacated and the charges against him dis-
missed in February 2000, yet he did not receive a decision by the
court until January 2008.
In Jones v. State, Mr. Jones had been convicted of a courtyard
murder based solely on the eyewitness testimony of one woman
who claimed she saw the shooting from her ninth floor balcony,
overlooking the dimly lit courtyard at 10 PM.2" A new trial was or-
dered when the prosecutor failed to correct materially false
testimony by this witness even though the prosecutor knew the tes-
timony to be false at the time. 2 9 At the new trial, three witnesses
came forward to testify that they were at dinner with the alleged
eyewitness at the time of the shooting and remembered coming
home to the crime scene with her after the shooting took place.3 o
The jury acquitted Mr. Jones of all charges.' Mr. Jones then filed a
civil lawsuit under New York's compensation statute. The state did
not put on a single piece of evidence or a single witness, while Mr.
Jones proffered two alibi witnesses and two other witnesses who
were at the scene of the crime, both of whom testified that the
shooter was not Mr. Jones. 2 Despite this fact, the state held Mr.
Jones to his burden-as it had a right to do-which meant that Mr.
Jones did not see a penny of compensation until three years after
his release from prison.3 3
There are several other examples where a trial court was faced
with "the uncontradicted testimony of the claimant and little
126. No. 102187, 2008 WL 220178, at *5 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. Jan. 7, 2008); see alsoJackson v.
State, No. 84611, slip op. at 11 (N.Y Ct. Cl. Apr. 22, 1998) ("Upon the record before it,
which includes no direct evidence of the claimant's guilt, the Court finds that claimant ...
has, by clear and convincing evidence established that he did not commit any of the acts
charged in the accusatory instrument and that his conduct did not cause or bring about his
conviction.").
127. Vera, 2008 WL 220178, at *1.
128. No. 2009-014-051, slip op. at 2 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. Aug. 19, 2009).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2-3; Matt Straquadine, Blood Target, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Oct. 7-Oct. 13,
2009, at 13, available at http://www.villagevoice.com/2009-10-06/news/lonnie-jones-s-head-
is-worth-20-000-in-coney-island-thank-the-brooklyn-bloods/.
131. Jones, No. 2009-014-051, slip op. at 3.
132. Id. As the court observed, "no evidence was adduced at trial which connects [Mr.
Jones] to the commission of the crimes of which he was convicted." Id. at 5.
133. Id. at 3.
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else."'" In these cases, the state offered "no eyewitness testimony,
admission [or] documentary evidence connecting claimant to the
crime.,,3s
Placing the burden on the claimant means that, in cases like
these, the claimant will not see any money for years after being re-
leased from prison unless she "settle [s] the case for less than her
damages, even though the evidence indicates she is 'in the right.'
The effect of such errors may be to frustrate such objectives as de-
terrence, compensation, or whatever other functions the
substantive law may have."' The main objective underlying state
compensation statutes is, to state the obvious, compensation.3 7 As a
result, the burden should be allocated to further this aim, not to
frustrate it.3s
Placing the burden on the state would force it to evaluate the
merits of the claims much earlier in the process and, where appro-
priate, seek a settlement because the state would not be able simply
to hold the claimant to his or her burden. This would be particu-
larly helpful in the context of wrongful conviction claims where the
state has the resources and ability to endure a contentious and pro-
tracted litigation, while the claimant-who often is hard-pressed
for money-does not. Shifting the burden to the state, therefore,
would "ensure that plaintiffs with sound claims will not needlessly
be forced to sue; the result will be to conserve judicial resources." 39
4. Consistency with the Presumption of Innocence
A less persuasive argument for shifting the burden to the state is
that such a shift would align the burden of proof with that em-
ployed in the criminal case. A fundamental precept of the criminal
justice system is that a defendant is presumed innocent until prov-
en guilty. By placing the burden of proof on the claimant to
establish his or her innocence in order to recover compensation
for a wrongful conviction, compensation statutes flip the presump-
134. Grimaldi v. State, N.Y.L.J., July 25,1989, at 22.
135. Scott v. State, No. 107647, 2006 WL 543713, at *3 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. Feb. 6, 2006).
136. Hay, supra note 125, at 654.
137. There are competing policies that the statutes attempt to balance, including keep-
ing costs in check and avoiding the compensation of guilty individuals. See infra Part IV.C.
138. Cf. Nat'l Commc'ns Ass'n v. AT&T Corp., 238 F.Sd 124, 131 (2d Cir. 2001) ("IT]he
policies underlying the statute at issue are appropriately considered by courts when allocat-
ing the burden of proof.").
139. Hay, supra note 125, at 656; see also Hay & Spier, supra note 109, at 413-14 ("Opti-
mally used, the burden of proof may minimize the expenditures devoted to gathering,
presenting and processing information in litigation.").
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tion of innocence on its head-presuming the claimant guilty until
proven innocent.
Legally, the presumption of innocence does not apply in civil
cases.14 0 In fact, even in the criminal context, the burden of proof
applies only to the trial. The Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfash noted
that the presumption of innocence "allocates the burden of proof
in criminal trials" and "may serve as an admonishment to the jury
to judge an accused's guilt or innocence solely on the evidence ad-
duced at trial." But the Court held that this presumption "has no
application to a determination of the rights of a pretrial detainee
during confinement before his trial has even begun."'4 If the pre-
sumption of innocence has no bearing on the pretrial stage of a
criminal case, then it certainly would not attach to an individual
suing the government civilly for compensation.
Some, however, believe that the presumption of innocence em-
anates not from legal principle, but from "political morality and
human dignity. The presumption of innocence is a normative
principle, directing state authorities as to the proper way of treat-
ing a person who has not yet been convicted.""' In a number of
countries, "the presumption of innocence is enjoyed by every per-
son, at all points in time, until her conviction by a court of
competent jurisdiction."4 3
When viewed in this light, the presumption of innocence would
apply regardless of the legal context, and therefore would attach to
an individual yet to be convicted of a crime, as well as to an indi-
vidual improperly convicted of one. However, while there is logical
force behind the argument that an individual who was never
properly convicted should be deemed innocent of the crime for
which he was charged, this normative argument does not preempt
the long-held legal principle that the presumption of innocence
applies only to criminal trials. Therefore, this argument should not
serve as the basis to shift the burden of proof-and the accompa-
nying costs-to the state which, in many cases, itself did not act
wrongly to cause the wrongful conviction.
140. See, e.g., Reed v. State, 574 N.E.2d 433, 436 (N.Y. 1991) ("We long ago held that the
presumption of innocence is not indulged in a civil action because of the lesser burden of
proof."); see also Rabon v. Great Sw. Fire Ins., 818 F.2d 306, 310-11 (4th Cir. 1987) (reversing
and remanding a finding of liability based on the fact that the trial court improperly in-
structed the jury that someone is presumed innocent of committing a crime both in the
criminal and civil context).
141. 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979).
142. Rinat Kitai, Presuming Innocence, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 257, 272 (2002).
143. Id. at 276.
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5. Deterrence of Wrongful Convictions
The tort system has long been recognized as serving as an effec-
tive deterrent.'4 For example, the Supreme Court has noted that
"implied private actions provide a most effective weapon in the en-
forcement of the securities laws and are a necessary supplement to
Commission action."'4 5 Similarly, the Court recently held that a vio-
lation of the requirement that police officers knock-and-announce
their presence before executing a search warrant need not require
the suppression of all evidence found during that search in order
to deter such conduct because, inter alia, "civil liability is an effec-
tive deterrent here, as we have assumed it is in other contexts.",4 6
It is arguable that wrongful conviction compensation lawsuits al-
so have a deterrent effect. 4 7 Exacting a large sum of money from
states arguably could cause them to take more measures to prevent
wrongful convictions in order to avoid paying damages in the fu-
ture on such claims.4" By extension, one could argue that shifting
the burden to the state would amplify this deterrent effect. Such an
argument, however, is based on several presumptions, all of which
are dubious.
144. See, e.g., Marc Galanter & David Luban, PoeticJustice: Punitive Damages and Legal Plu-
ralism, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1393, 1405 (1993) ("In tort and contract law, liability is determined
and damages assessed with an eye toward affecting the behavior of the defendant and those
similarly situated. Thus, even though damages are labeled as compensatory, the focus is not
entirely on the victim's loss, but also on the conduct of potential wrongdoers.").
145. Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310 (1985) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
146. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598 (2006).
147. See Garrett, supra note 3, at 121 ("[A]n important impact of post-conviction DNA
testing may be that civil rights actions filed by a select group of exonerees disproportionately
deter law enforcement and prosecutors from violating fair trial rights."); Garrett, supra note
9, at 100-02 ("Wrongful conviction actions finally provide a mechanism to return the deter-
rent power of the Constitution to our criminal justice system, but in a civil forum....
Federal discovery alone may go a long way toward uncovering and providing the remedy for
patterns of error in our criminal justice system.").
148. Lauren C. Boucher, Comment, Advancing the Argument in Favor of State Compensation
for the Erroneously Convicted and Wrongfully Incarcerated, 56 CATH. U. L. REv. 1069, 1102-03
(2007) ("The least cost avoider theory posits that in cases of accidental harm, the party that
was best able to avoid the harm by taking preventive measures must be held liable. This
creates an incentive to implement the cautionary measures in his control, thereby prevent-
ing, or at least decreasing, the likelihood of the accident in the future.... [T]he most
common causes of erroneous conviction-mistaken eyewitness identification, crime lab
error, and ineffective defense counsel-can all be decreased through state preventive ac-
tions.... [I]mplementing relatively simple lineup procedures can greatly reduce the
likelihood of mistaken eyewitness identification. Likewise, changes in crime lab administra-
tion and regulation can decrease the incidence of crime lab error. In addition, reform of
indigent defense systems will result in a lower probability of receiving ineffective counsel at
trial.").
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First, in order for burden-shifting to have any impact on wrong-
ful convictions, that burden-shift must result in increased costs to
the state (either by increasing the cost of litigation for the state or
the overall amount of damages the state would pay). Although as a
practical matter this may occur, if the shift in burden is coupled
with caps on damages, as suggested infra, it would equalize or de-
crease the overall costs paid by the state.
Second, wrongful conviction lawsuits themselves may have no
deterrent effect on states because state governments are not as ob-
viously susceptible to economic incentives as private parties.
"Because government actors respond to political, not market, in-
centives, we should not assume that government will internalize
social costs just because it is forced to make a budgetary outlay."'4 9
This is compounded by the large number of government players
that have an impact on wrongful convictions-the state legislature,
the governor, the police, and prosecutors-as well as defense at-
torneys and judges who are outside the control of the state.50 It is
unclear what impact, if any, increased costs resulting from wrong-
ful conviction lawsuits would have on any of these actors in the face
of competing political and social influences. 5 1
Lastly, this deterrence argument presumes that the state needs
additional incentives to curb wrongful convictions. As discussed
supra, there is an increasingly widespread effort to stop wrongful
convictions. And there is already a strong incentive for each seg-
ment of the criminal justice system to end this phenomenon-not
only do wrongful convictions destroy the lives of the innocent indi-
viduals convicted, they also leave at large the actual perpetrator
who is free to commit more crimes against additional innocent vic-
tims. In fact, compensation lawsuits may actually undermine the
state's attempts to reform the system, at least in the short term. In-
creasing the costs associated with compensation lawsuits will shrink
the state's budgetary capacity and, therefore, hinder its ability to
spend money on steps to prevent wrongful conviction.
149. Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Con-
stitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 345, 347-48 (2000).
150. Each of these individuals is accountable to several, sometimes competing constitu-
encies, including the voting public, crime victims, state laws, internal guidelines and rules, as
well as each individual's own notion of 'justice." See, e.g., Roberta K Flowers, A Code of Their
Own: Updating the Ethics Codes to Include the Non-Adversarial Roles of Federal Prosecutors, 37 B.C.
L. REv. 923, 931 (1996).
151. But see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 57 (6th ed. 2003) ("Alt-
hough government procurement decisions cannot be assumed to be made on the same
profit-maximizing basis as private procurement decisions ... it would be reckless to assume
that the government is immune to budgetary considerations and could therefore be relied
on always to buy the socially least costly inputs, regardless of their price.").
157FALL 2010]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
C. Arguments Against Shifting the Burden to the State
Despite the justifications enumerated above, there also are com-
pelling arguments against shifting the burden to the state on the
issue of guilt. First, by shifting the burden to the state, there is an
increased risk that the state would be forced to compensate an in-
dividual who is, in fact, guilty of the crime and who was only
released from prison on a technicality or other grounds not neces-
sarily consistent with innocence. Second, shifting the burden to the
state has the potential to increase the cost to the government and,
by extension, the taxpaying public. There also is a less-persuasive
argument against shifting the burden: namely, that burden-shifting
schemes in general are difficult for courts to administer.
1. Compensating the Guilty
A finding that an individual was wrongfully convicted is not syn-
onymous with innocence. There are a number of grounds on
which an individual's conviction can be reversed other than actual
innocence-in fact, appeals themselves rarely are grounded on
claims of actual innocence.' Shifting the burden to the state to
prove guilt, then, could lead to an increased chance that a guilty
individual, released on a legal technicality, gets compensated. In
that situation, a guilty individual who deserves to be in prison
would not only escape the justified punishment, but would actually
be rewarded for the portion of the sentence that he or she rightful-
ly served. This is repugnant to public policy and contrary to the
stated intent of the wrongful conviction compensation statutes,
which "were intended to compensate the innocent for wrongful
imprisonment" and not "to compensate those who had merely
avoided criminal liability."'5 3
There are, however, several ways to address this concern. First,
there is already a check built into the criminal justice system to en-
sure that a conviction is not reversed based solely on a legal
technicality. The "harmless error" rule permits courts to "block set-
ting aside convictions for small errors or defects that have little, if
152. See, e.g., Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995) ("[H]abeas corpus petitions that
advance a substantial claim of actual innocence are extremely rare.").
153. Chandler v. State, 641 N.E.2d 1382, 1385 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994); see also Rogers v.
State, 694 N.Y.S.2d 874, 877 (Ct. Cl. 1999) ("[T]he Legislature did not intend to provide
monetary compensation for every mistake made in the course of a prosecution of an indi-
vidual for a crime he did not commit and for which he was imprisoned.").
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any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial."'" The
rule first found its place in the American justice system when the
public at large became frustrated by automatic reversals on ex-
tremely technical grounds.'5 Although the rule was initially limited
to certain types of trial errors, and was not applicable to constitu-
tional errors, 1 5 6 in Chapman v. Califmia, the Supreme Court
decided that even some constitutional errors can be held harmless
so long as the court can "declare a belief that [the error] was harm-
less beyond a reasonable doubt."57 Over the years, the Supreme
Court has expanded the types of errors that can be held harm-
less.15 8 In Rose v. Clark, the Supreme Court made clear that "while
there are some errors to which Chapman does not apply, they are
the exception and not the rule."'5 In Arizona v. Fulminante, the Su-
preme Court extended the scope of the harmless error rule to
encompass coerced confessions.'w
Moreover, while a strict application of the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard would seemingly lead to reversal unless the error is
"technical, marginal, or insignificant,"m in practice, courts have em-
ployed the harmless error rule liberally to preclude reversals in an
overwhelming number of cases. 6 2 Indeed, "there is a widespread
154. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967).
155. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of Applying Harmless
Error to Coerced Confessions, 105 HARV. L. REv. 152, 156 (1991).
156. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946).
157. 386 U.S. at 24. There is debate about whether the Supreme Court has adopted di-
vergent standards for determining whether such an error is harmless-one being the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" established in Chapman, and the other being "overwhelming
evidence of guilt." See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969) ("The case against
Harrington was not woven from circumstantial evidence. It is so overwhelming that unless
we say that no violation of Bruton can constitute harmless error, we must leave this state
conviction undisturbed."); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Harmless Constitutional Error and the Institu-
tional Significance of the Jury, 26 FORDHAM L. REv. 2027, 2036-37 (2008).
158. See Ogletree, supra note 155, at 159; see also Meltzer, supra note 42, at 3-4 ("Thus,
commentators have discussed, often critically, the Supreme Court's extension of the range
of issues that can be subjected to harmless error analysis, ... [such as] the Court's decision
last Term in Brecht v Abrahamson that when federal courts determine, under their habeas
corpus jurisdiction, whether a federal constitutional error infected a state criminal convic-
tion, an error should be deemed harmless unless it 'had substantial and injurious effect or
influence in determining the jury's verdict.' That formulation is less protective of criminal
defendants than the 'harmless beyond a reasonable doubt' standard that, under Chapman,
governs on direct review." (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (2006)); Fairfax,
supra note 157, at 2029 (2008) ("The Supreme Court has been sparing in its designation of
errors as structural, thus far admitting only a handful of constitutional defects into the cate-
gory of errors requiring automatic reversal.").
159. 478 U.S. 570, 578 (1986).
160. 499 U.S. 279 (1991); see also Ogletree, supra note 155, at 155-56.
161. Ogletree, supra note 155, at 159.
162. See Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the Rights/Remedies Split, 88 VA. L. REV. 1, 7
(2002) ("[In] a database of nearly 300 California Supreme Court decisions in death penalty
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perception that in the Supreme Court, as well as in state and lower
federal courts, errors of some substance are nonetheless found
harmless so as to permit the affirmance of convictions." 163
As a result, where an individual is believed by a court to be
guilty, it is unlikely that a trial error would lead to a reversal, which
means that the individual will not be released from prison and
cannot file a wrongful conviction civil action under a compensa-
tion statute. Yet there are still trial errors that are exempt
altogether from harmless error analysis 64 and, even for those that
are not, it is inevitable that some errors will not be deemed harm-
less and that some guilty individuals will have their convictions
reversed.
There is, however, a second method of addressing the concern
that a burden-shifting scheme would lead to the compensation of
guilty individuals. The compensation statutes themselves can be
drafted to exclude those individuals who have been released on a
technicality.65 Rather than permitting anyone to bring an action
under the compensation statute-as in New Jersey or Wiscon-
sin'"-states can adopt eligibility requirements that require the
individual to have been acquitted at a retrial or had their convic-
tion reversed or vacated on an enumerated list of non-technical
grounds. In New York, for example, although the compensation
statute provides for eligibility if the claimant had the conviction
vacated or reversed and either the accusatory instrument was dis-
missed or the claimant was acquitted at a retrial,'6 1 the statute only
permits relief if the conviction was reversed on one of several speci-
cases, ... during a ten year period, over ninety percent of death sentences imposed by trial
courts were upheld on appeal even though nearly every case was found to have been tainted
by constitutional error."); see also Garrett, supra note 3, at 108 ("Of exonerees with written
decisions, 32% had a court [previously] rely on harmless error.").
163. Meltzer, supra note 42, at 4.
164. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309-10 (noting that the following are not subject to harm-
less error review: deprivation of the right to counsel at trial, a judge who was not impartial,
unlawful exclusion of members of the defendant's race from a grand jury, the right to self-
representation at trial, and the right to public trial). Moreover, Brady violations are not sub-
ject to harmless error review, but lead to a reversal "if there is a reasonable probability that,
had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have
been different." Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995) (quoting United States v. Bagley,
473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)).
165. See, e.g., Boucher, supra note 148, at 1099 ("Legislatures can carefully draft a statute
to prevent unwarranted claims from being considered.").
166. See supra Part III.A & note 65.
167. See, e.g., Long v. State, 852 N.E.2d 1150, 1153 (N.Y. 2006) ("A claimant may there-
fore seek redress where the court (1) vacates (or reverses) the judgment and dismisses the
accusatory instrument; (2) vacates the judgment and orders a new trial, followed by a subse-
quent dismissal of the accusatory instrument before retrial; or (3) vacates the judgment and
orders a new trial, resulting in a not guilty verdict.").
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fied grounds. Consequently, a claimant is not even eligible to bring
suit under the statute if his or her conviction was reversed or vacat-
ed on a ground not enumerated in the statute."
The statutes also can employ effective disqualification provisions
to ensure that an individual who is guilty of a lesser-included of-
fense or who was serving a concurrent or subsequent prison
sentence for another crime cannot recover compensation. As the
Ohio Supreme Court has noted, such a disqualification provision
"is intended to filter out those claimants who have had their con-
victions reversed, but were committing a different offense at the
time that they were engaging in the activity for which they were
initially charged." 69
Of course, any statutory construct will be both over- and under-
inclusive. In New York, the preclusion of a right of action for those
individuals whose convictions were reversed on a technicality pre-
cludes recovery for that subset of individuals who are, in fact,
innocent. One court captured this concern:
In a matter which has garnered great public scrutiny, Betty Ty-
son has served some 25 years in State correctional facilities for
a criminal conviction that is now vacated. However, the Legis-
lature, in its wisdom, has placed a high threshold upon those
seeking recompense under this statute, and unfortunately for
Betty Tyson, her claim cannot surmount that limitation. And
note that this is a threshold, not a roadblock, because the
remedy for which recompense is sought here is a statutory
creation, not a common-law right, and thus I am bound by the
Legislature's draftsmanship. So, unfortunately for Betty Tyson,
there can be no recovery here, and no opportunity for her to
prove her innocence, perhaps her ultimate goal.'
168. See, e.g., Leka v. State, 791 N.Y.S.2d 660, 661 (App. Div. 2005) ("Contrary to the
claimant's contention, his claim does not state a cause of action under Court of Claims Act
§ 8-b (3) (b), as the vacatur of his May 1990 conviction due to the People's failure to disclose
certain Brady material was not based on any of the grounds set forth in the statute or prem-
ised on any likelihood of innocence, but rather on the ground that the claimant was
deprived of his due process rights as guaranteed by the United States Constitution.");
Romero v. State, 742 N.Y.S.2d 701, 705 (App. Div. 2002) (finding that claimant failed to meet
pleading requirements where "the reversal of his criminal convictions and dismissal of the
indictment [was] on technical grounds"); Guce v. State, 637 N.YS.2d 483, 484 (App. Div.
1996) ("As the claimant failed to present documentary evidence to establish that his convic-
tion was vacated and that the indictment was dismissed on one of the grounds enumerated
in Court of Claims Act § 8-b, the State's motion [to dismiss] should have been granted.").
169. Gover v. State, 616 N.E.2d 207, 209 (Ohio 1993).
170. Tyson v. State, 698 N.YS.2d 410, 415 (Ct. Cl. 1999). In Tyson's case, there were two
witnesses who allegedly claimed to have seen her commit the crime. One, however, told the
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On the other hand, such eligibility requirements will be over-
inclusive, granting access to a subset of individuals who are guilty.
For example, an acquittal at a retrial is not synonymous with inno-
cence."' A guilty individual can be found innocent at a retrial
because the state does not have sufficient evidence to convict, be-
cause the jury incorrectly concludes that the defendant is
innocent, or because the jury believes the defendant is guilty but is
not certain beyond a reasonable doubt. Under New York's com-
pensation statute, this individual could sue the state for
compensation.
However, "[a]lthough an acquittal is not, ipso facto, equivalent
to a determination of innocence, generally or for purposes of this
remedial statute, it is a useful and relevant indicator of innocence,
just as the grounds enumerated in the proviso clause are.""' There-
fore, an individual who was acquitted at a retrial, had the
conviction vacated or the accusatory instrument dismissed has a
higher probability of succeeding on a civil claim for wrongful con-
viction, which itself is a justification for shifting the burden of
proof to the state on the issue of guilt.73
Moreover, even where the harmless error rule and eligibility re-
quirements do not prevent a guilty individual from bringing suit
under a compensation statute, shifting the burden to the state does
not mean that those individuals will be compensated. Indeed, un-
der the current statutory framework, many states force claimants to
prove their innocence by a preponderance of the evidence, so a
claimant need only establish innocence by roughly a 51% certain-
ty.174 If the state is able to rebut a claimant's case where the
police at the scene that he did not see anything, but the police withheld this statement. The
other later recanted. Manny Fernandez, Examining Human Error in Wrongful Convictions, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 2009, at A25; Jane Gross, A Conviction Ruled Unjust Leads to a Redemption, N.Y.
TIMES, May 29, 1998, at Bl.
171. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 194 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("A not guilty
verdict expresses no view as to a defendant's innocence. Rather, [a reversal of conviction]
indicates simply that the prosecution has failed to meet its burden of proof." (substitution in
original) (quoting People v. Smith, 708 N.E.2d 365, 371 (Ill. 1999))).
172. Ivey v. State, 606 N.E.2d 1360, 1363 (N.Y. 1992) (internal citations omitted).
173. See Hay, supra note 125, at 678 (noting that under the current legal framework the
burden of proof is commonly placed on the defendant when, "given the facts available to
the court, the probability is high that the plaintiff is correct").
174. See, e.g., M. Neil Browne & Ronda R. Harrison-Spoerl, PuttingExpert Testimony in Its
Epistemological Place: What Predictions ofDangerousness in Court Can Teach Us, 91 MARQ. L. REV.
1119, 1208 n.425 (2008) (quantifying different legal standards as follows, according to cer-
tainty level: beyond a reasonable doubt = 95%; clear and convincing evidence = 75%; and
preponderance of the evidence = 51%.). Therefore, even in the states that employ a clear
and convincing evidence standard, theoretically there could be a 25% chance that the indi-
vidual being compensated is guilty. In fact, even in cases in which someone is released based
on DNA evidence, the individual still may be guilty of committing or aiding the crime. In
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claimant bears the burden-providing sufficient evidence to
demonstrate that the plaintiff is at least 50% likely to have commit-
ted the crime-then it is doubtful that the state would not also be
able to establish guilt by 51%. The question, then, becomes one of
cost, and who is in the best position to prove their case. If the state
is in the better position to prove guilt-because it has better access
to evidence and more resources than the claimant, as discussed
supra-then placing the burden on the claimant is more likely to
result in the failure to compensate an innocent individual than
shifting the burden to the state would be to result in the compen-
sation of a guilty person.'
2. Increased Costs to the State
A second concern implicated by shifting the burden to the state
to prove the claimant's guilt is the likelihood that such a shift
would increase the state's annual expenditures. If under the cur-
rent framework a number of meritorious claims never make it to
trial-either because the claimant settles for less than the claim is
worth or does not bring a claim at all due to the cost of litigation-
then a shift in burden will result in more meritorious claims litigat-
ed to a conclusion, and the state will be forced to pay additional
damages on those claims. Along these lines, one Texas appellate
court denied an expansive reading of the eligibility requirements
under the Texas compensation statute because such a reading
Broum v. State, No. L-05-1050, 2006 WL 751364, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2006), the
claimant was granted a new trial for murder when DNA evidence established that the semen
found in the victim was not claimant's. However, in affirming the grant of summary judg-
ment to the state on the claimant's wrongful conviction compensation suit, the Ohio Court
of Appeals stated:
Appellant asserts that the DNA evidence is compelling evidence of his innocence and
raises a genuine issue of material fact on that issue. The DNA evidence, however, only
establishes that appellant did not rape Bobbie Russell. Moreover, it is noteworthy that
appellant was never convicted of raping Russell. Rather, he was convicted of aggra-
vated murder in the commission of an aggravated burglary.
Id. at *5.
175. If there remains a concern about compensating the guilty, the state also could cre-
ate disincentives for guilty individuals to sue the state. For example, the legislature could
provide that the claimant be forced to pay the state's costs if the state proves guilt by clear
and convincing evidence. Cf. Mo. REV. STAT. § 650.058 (2007) ("If the results of the DNA
testing confirm the person's guilt, then the person filing for DNA testing ... shall: (1) Be
liable for any reasonable costs incurred when conducting the DNA test, including but not
limited to the cost of the test. Such costs shall be determined by the court and shall be in-
cluded in the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the court; and (2) Be
sanctioned.").
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has potentially significant fiscal consequences.... If, as [the
claimant] urges, the legislature waived sovereign immunity to
permit wrongful-imprisonment claims by claimants whose
convictions were set aside on direct appeals and not solely
through habeas corpus relief based on 'actual innocence,' the
fiscal consequences for the State could be dramatically more
significant.""
Thus, rather than being able to spend money on education,
public safety, tax cuts, or even the prevention of wrongful convic-
tions, states will be forced to allocate that money to damage awards
for wrongful conviction claimants. Most states already are over-
extended and do not have sufficient funds to pay for imperative
government programs, so they may not be so willing to provide ad-
ditional funds for this objective.
However, there is a simple solution to this concern: a reasonable
cap on damages. As described supra, six jurisdictions place no lim-
its on damage awards while the remainder cap damages on a daily,
annual, or sum-total basis. States can limit each claimant's recovery
by dividing the total amount that the states wish to allocate by the
anticipated number of claimants. The states could add more
claimants to the denominator in order to ensure that they do not
end up over budget in the event that there are more claims than
anticipated.
There is no doubt that placing such limits on recovery will un-
der-compensate some individuals for their wrongful conviction.
However, the current system already under-compensates a number
of individuals by creating bars to recovery based on an unduly dif-
ficult burden and the high costs of protracted litigation. Under the
current framework, many meritorious claims receive no award
while a lucky few recover in full (after years of litigation). By shift-
ing the burden to the state to prove the claimant's guilt, and by
implementing reasonable caps on damages, a much larger number
of claimants would be able to recover more quickly, even though
the amount recovered would be lower. It would be preferable to
award each wrongfully convicted individual $200,000 than to award
a select few $600,000 each.
176. State v. Young, 265 S.W.3d 697, 707-08 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008) (citations omitted).
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3. Difficulty in Administering a Burden-Shifting Scheme
There also is an argument that states should not shift the
burden to the state in wrongful conviction civil cases because
burden-shifting schemes, in general, are difficult for courts to
administer."' This argument, however, is not persuasive, because
courts routinely handle cases in which the burden of proof on a
particular issue is shifted to the defendant for reasons similar to
the justifications described supra-namely, that the defendant has
greater access to evidence or has an easier time satisfying the
burden than does the plaintiff. For example, courts invoke the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to shift the burden to the defendant on
the issue of a defendant's own negligence in cases that generally
result from negligence and on the issue of product defects in
product liability suits."" "Res ipsa loquitur is grounded in the sound
procedural policy of placing the duty of producing evidence on
the party who has superior knowledge or opportunity to explain
the causative circumstances."" 9
Courts also shift the burden in certain cases where the plaintiff
is able to make a prima facie showing on a particular issue. For ex-
ample, in Title VII employment discrimination cases, the plaintiff
bears the initial burden of making out a prima facie case of dis-
crimination. 80
177. For example, in deciding that the ADEA is not subject to the same burden-shifting
scheme as Title VII cases, the Supreme Court noted that some burden shifting schemes are
difficult to apply. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2352 (2009). It should be not-
ed that in Gross, the Court was referring to "cases tried to ajury," where "courts have found it
particularly difficult to craft an instruction to explain its burden-shifting framework." Id.
Under most compensation statutes, the case is not tried to ajury.
178. See Hay & Spier, supra note 109, at 425.
179. Fedorczyk v. Caribbean Cruise Lines, 82 F.3d 69, 74 (3d Cir. 1996) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
180. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Courts also have
administered burden-shifting schemes in cases involving discrimination where the state is
the defendant. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Unexplainable on Grounds Other Than Race":
The Inversion of Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection jurisprudence, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV.
615, 691 (2003) ("Because the burden-shifting standard governs many statutory antidiscrim-
ination contexts, courts are competent to administer this test in equal protection litigation.
Furthermore, the fact that statutorily imposed impact standards apply in cases where states
are defendants, courts have already encountered institutional concerns in these settings.");
see also Torres-Martinez v. P.R. Dep't of Corr., 485 F.3d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 2007) ("Once a plain-
tiff has made out a prima facie case of political discrimination, the burden then shifts to the
state to show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same deci-
sion as to plaintiffs employment even in the absence of the protected conduct." (internal
quotes and brackets omitted)); Cloverland-Green Spring Dairies, Inc. v. Pa. Milk Mktg. Bd.,
462 F.3d 249, 261 (3d Cir. 2006) ("The party challenging the statute has the burden of prov-
ing the existence of such discrimination, and the burden then shifts to the state to prove
that the statute serves a legitimate local purpose, and that this purpose could not be served
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This may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial
minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for
which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite
his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his re-
jection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's
qualifications."'
Once the plaintiff has done that, "[t] he burden then must shift to
the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
son for the employee's rejection.""' The rationale for this burden
shift is that the defendant, not the plaintiff, has access to direct ev-
idence of intent to discriminate, making it difficult for the plaintiff
to prove.1
Similarly, the court regularly shifts the burden to the defendant
on the issue of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(k) (2). Under Rule 4(k) (2),
[f] or a claim that arises under federal law, serving a summons
or filing a waiver of service establishes personal jurisdiction
over a defendant if: (A) the defendant is not subject to juris-
diction in any state's courts of general jurisdiction; and
(B) exercising jurisdiction is consistent with the United States
Constitution and laws.
Forcing the plaintiff to prove that the defendant is not subject to
jurisdiction in any state's courts of general jurisdiction "poses prac-
tical difficulties for district courts," 185 especially because "the
defendant, and not the plaintiff, oftentimes possesses the necessary
as well by available nondiscriminatory means." (internal citations and quotation marks omit-
ted)).
181. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
182. Id.; see also Hay & Spier, supra note 109, at 427 ("Roughly speaking, if the plaintiffs
can show they were treated differently from a group of similarly situated male employees,
the defendant must come forward with evidence that the plaintiff was not fired for discrimi-
natory reasons.").
183. See, e.g., Hildebrandt v. Ill. Dep't of Natural Res., 347 F.3d 1014, 1029 (7th Cir.
2003); Burgess v. Washington Dep't of Corr., No. 98-35417, 1999 WL 974182, at *2 (9th Cir.
Oct. 22, 1999) ("In most employment discrimination cases, direct evidence of discriminatory
motive is unavailable or difficult to obtain. Therefore, the Supreme Court has set forth an
indirect method of proof which relies on presumptions and shifting burdens of produc-
tion.").
184. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2).
185. Touchcom, Inc. v. Bereskin & Parr, 574 F.3d 1403, 1413 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
[VOL. 44:1166
Presumed Guilty Until Proven Innocent
information to do so."'86 As a result, many of the circuits that have
addressed this issue place the burden on the defendant. 7 Failure
to relieve the plaintiff of this burden, these courts have rational-
ized, would allow "some defendants to escape jurisdiction due to
the excessive burden involved in making such a showing. It is diffi-
cult to prove a negative."018  Other circuits, such as the First and
Fourth Circuit, have adopted a similar approach, but require that
the plaintiff first certify that based on available information the
defendant is not subject to suit in the courts of general jurisdiction
of any state.'"
If the plaintiff makes out his prima facie case, the burden
shifts to the defendant to produce evidence which, if credited,
would show either that one or more specific states exist in
which it would be subject to suit or that its contacts with the
United States are constitutionally insufficient.9 o
These formulas for shifting the burden of proof to the defend-
ant in the above-referenced circumstances are apposite examples
for wrongful conviction claims.'9' In the wrongful conviction civil
context, the claimant would bear the burden on the eligibility re-
quirements and disqualification provisions-establishing that he or
she is rightfully suing under the compensation statute. The burden
then would shift to the state to prove that the claimant is guilty of
the crime for which he or she was convicted. The burden would
then shift back to the claimant to prove that he or she is entitled to
damages, and the amount of those damages.
CONCLUSION
This Article has examined the current statutory framework for
wrongful conviction compensation claims and has attempted to
186. Synthes v. G.M. Dos Reis Jr. Ind. Com. De Equip. Medico, 563 F.3d 1285, 1294
(Fed. Cir. 2009).
187. Touchcom, 574 F.3d at 1414 ("In dealing with the second requirement of Rule
4(k) (2), the Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Eleventh, and DC Circuits have adopted an approach
that places the burden on the defendant.").
188. Id. at 1415.
189. See, e.g., United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, 191 F.3d 30, 41 (1st Cir. 1999).
190. Id.
191. Some examples are more on point than others. Shifting the burden in wrongful
conviction claims on the issue of guilt is a shift in the primary element of the claim. This is
similar to the employment discrimination cases. On the other hand, personal jurisdiction is
not a central determining factor for liability.
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outline the chief arguments for and against shifting the burden to
the state to prove the claimant's guilt after the claimant has estab-
lished that he or she is eligible to sue under the relevant statute.
Although shifting the burden makes sense from an efficiency per-
spective (because the government has better access to the relevant
evidence and could rely exclusively on the criminal trial transcript)
and from a cost-spreading perspective (because the state is in a bet-
ter position to bear the costs of litigation and to determine when to
settle), there also are strong arguments against shifting the burden
grounded in public policy. Shifting the burden to the state could
increase the risk of compensating a guilty individual and may di-
vert money away from important social goals. And while there are
safeguards that can be implemented to minimize these concerns,
there is no way to eliminate them altogether.
Regardless of whether or not states adopt a burden-shifting
scheme, however, a debate must be had about how to compensate
wrongfully convicted individuals in a timely fashion so that they are
not released from prison to face employment, medical, emotional,
and psychological obstacles without the means necessary to over-
come them. As horrific as a wrongful conviction is-both because
it sends an innocent person to jail and because it leaves the guilty
person free to strike again-once discovered, the suffering should
end.
Removing eligibility requirements and eliminating caps on dam-
age, as some have advocated, would not solve this problem. In fact,
New York's compensation statute does not place any limits on
damages and contains moderate eligibility requirements, yet judg-
ments for compensation awards in New York still are few and far
between. Shifting the burden to the state to prove the claimant's
guilt would be a productive solution because states would be in-
duced to settle meritorious claims early in order to avoid litigation
costs and, even where the states proceed to trial, the claimant
would be relieved of the substantial expenses associated with prov-
ing innocence. By implementing, rather than eliminating, caps on
damages and eligibility requirements, shifting the burden may be
the most effective way to improve the process by which compensa-
tion is awarded to those innocent individuals who have been the
unintended collateral consequence of the criminal justice system.
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